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NO “NEW” BREACHES: ADDING A SECTION
TO THE INDIANA MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
ACT TO ALLEVIATE THE PAIN CAUSED BY
K.D. V. CHAMBERS
I. INTRODUCTION
Fitz visits Green Medical Center with stomach pain.1 The physician
on duty, Dr. Huck, determines that Fitz needs a quick outpatient
procedure to remedy his ailment. The procedure goes well, and Dr.
Huck sends him home to recover. Three days later, Fitz experiences
excruciating stomach pain, and Dr. Huck advises him to go to
Lynniebrook Hospital. Within five hours of his arrival at the hospital,
Dr. Syrus, a general surgeon, performs surgery on him. The next day,
Nurse Quinn monitors Fitz, charting his progress and her care of him.
He is recovering well, and the hospital staff informs his wife that he will
be released in a few days. However, just a few hours later, Fitz’s
condition changes drastically. The on-call physician, Dr. Harrison,
enters the room within three minutes of hearing the emergency code
being called, and Dr. Harrison and Nurse Quinn attempt to resuscitate
Fitz. Thirty minutes later, he is declared dead.
Fitz’s wife hires Olivia, a local attorney, to file suit. Complying with
the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act, Olivia first files a proposed
complaint on behalf of Fitz’s estate and his wife with the Indiana
Department of Insurance and serves all parties.2 The list of defendants is
complex. She sues Green Medical Center and its employee, Dr. Huck,
Lynniebrook Hospital and employees Dr. Harrison and Nurse Quinn,
and IND Medial Group and its employee Dr. Syrus. The parties begin
discovery, and submit evidence to the medical review panel (“Panel”) to
support their arguments that the medical providers did or did not breach
the applicable standard of care in their treatment of Fitz.3 The Panel
determines Dr. Huck (which includes Green Medical Center) and Dr.
Syrus (which includes IND Medical Group) breached the standard of
care. However, it finds that Lynniebrook Hospital and its employees did
not breach the standard of care. Now, a trial court gains jurisdiction over
the case, and it proceeds like any other civil suit.4
The hypothetical scenario is fictional and is the sole creation of the author.
See infra notes 43–46 and accompanying text (reviewing the procedure to commence a
medical malpractice lawsuit in Indiana).
3
See infra notes 57–63 and accompanying text (explaining the requirements for a Panel
submission and the acceptable forms of evidence that the parties may submit to the Panel).
4
See infra notes 69–71 and accompanying text (discussing the statutory requirements
for a trial court to gain jurisdiction in a medical malpractice case).
1
2
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Two weeks later, Lynniebrook Hospital files a motion for summary
judgment, arguing that the court should grant its motion because the
Panel did not find that the hospital or its employees breached the
standard of care, therefore no claim exists for which relief may be
granted.5 Olivia wants to keep the hospital in the suit, but knows that
she does not have a strong case against Lynniebrook. Along with the
unfavorable Panel opinion, the notes in Fitz’s medical chart do not yield
any damaging evidence against the hospital. At this point, Olivia’s
argument to maintain a cause of action against the hospital will not
likely prevail.6
The next day, Olivia receives a call from Dr. Huck’s counsel, who
informs her that Lynniebrook Hospital was at fault for Fitz’s death. The
attorney could not provide any more details, so Olivia scrambles to
validate this claim. The only individual who was unavailable during
discovery, prior to the Panel review meeting, was Nurse Quinn. With
high hopes that the nurse might be able to provide more information,
Olivia hires a private investigator to locate Nurse Quinn.
Nurse Quinn’s deposition turns out to be a game-changer for the
case. The nurse admits that she was fired from Lynniebrook, and says
that she will no longer lie for the hospital. She explains that it is
common practice at Lynniebrook to “leave things out of charts that
might be problematic,” such as changing a patient’s medicine dosage
without authorization by a doctor, or charting that a nurse did
something when it was really an aide. Nurse Quinn says she remembers
caring for Fitz and knows she was not in the room when his vital signs
deteriorated. However, she came in as soon as an aide yelled for her so
she charted that she had been in the room to avoid anyone questioning
the aide. The nurse began to cry, and regrettably testified “that aide
could have done anything to the patient. When I walked in, he had a
syringe in his hand. That’s probably why that poor man is dead!”
Now, Olivia has to find a way to keep Lynniebrook Hospital in the
suit. With this new evidence, she will be able to prove that the hospital,
through its employees, committed a breach in the standard of care.7
5
See infra notes 62–68 and accompanying text (reviewing the four opinions available to
the Panel when it determines what constitutes a breach of the applicable standard of care
and the implications of a positive or negative opinion by the Panel for each health care
provider).
6
See infra note 68 and accompanying text (explaining that an unfavorable opinion from
the Panel is not a complete bar to recovery, but is often grounds for a defendant health care
provider to file a motion for summary judgment).
7
See infra note 63 and accompanying text (reviewing the Act’s requirement that the
Panel must determine whether each health care provider breached the applicable standard
of care).
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Olivia asks the judge to deny the hospital’s motion for summary
judgment based on this new evidence. The hospital cites a recent case
and argues that the evidence is inadmissible because this issue was never
presented to the Panel.8 The judge researches the law, and it is clear—
evidence not presented to and reviewed by a Panel is inadmissible.9
With no authority to remand the case to the Panel for further review, the
judge has no choice but to grant summary judgment for the hospital.10
This Note proposes an additional statutory section to chapter ten, the
Panel chapter, of the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act, to ensure that
parties have a fair chance to present every viable theory of recovery to a
court.11 If a new theory comes to light after a Panel renders an opinion,
judges should have the discretionary authority to remand the case to the
Panel for further review, or to permit the parties to proceed without
further review by the Panel.12 With this authority, unjust situations, such
as the hypothetical just presented, are preventable.13
First, Part II of this Note describes the Indiana Medical Malpractice
Act’s purpose and reasons for enactment by the Indiana General
Assembly, with an emphasis on the Panel provisions.14 This Part also
explains how malpractice claims work through the Panel process,
discusses case law concerning the Panel, and considers the relevant
evidentiary and trial rules that govern the trial court.15 Next, Part III
analyzes the prerequisite Panel requirement with Miller v. Memorial
Hospital of South Bend and K.D. v. Chambers as precedent, how judicial
discretion might be used to alleviate the implications of conflicting case

See infra note 86 and accompanying text (presenting the holding from the recent case
from the Indiana Court of Appeals, K.D. v. Chambers, where the court held that evidence
not submitted to a Panel is inadmissible at trial).
9
See id. (discussing the court’s holding in K.D. v. Chambers).
10
See infra notes 130–34 and accompanying text (exploring the implications of the K.D. v.
Chambers holding).
11
See infra Part IV (proposing an additional section to include in the Panel chapter of the
Act, which focuses primarily on judicial discretion when evidence of an additional breach
in the applicable standard of care is discovered after a Panel renders an opinion).
12
See id. (arguing for the benefits of this judicial authority and discussing its possible
implications to the overall process of medical malpractice claims).
13
See infra notes 204–09 and accompanying text (resolving the hypothetical with the
proposed section to chapter ten of the Act).
14
See infra Part II (exploring the history of the Act, including an Indiana governor’s call
for legislative reform, and an overview of how medical malpractice claims work in Indiana,
highlighting the Panel process).
15
See id. (explaining how a medical malpractice case works through the Panel process,
case law addressing the Panel requirement focusing primarily on Miller v. Memorial Hospital
of South Bend and K.D. v. Chambers, and relevant evidentiary and trial rules).
8
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law, and whether the courts or legislature should provide a remedy.16
Finally, Part IV proposes an additional section that the Indiana General
Assembly should include in the Panel chapter to remedy the unfortunate
result of K.D. v. Chambers, and discusses the advantages and possible
implications of the proposed section’s enactment.17 The proposed
section grants trial judges the authority to remand cases to a Panel for
further review when parties discover evidence of an additional breach
after the Panel process.18
II. BACKGROUND
The Panel requirement of the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act
(“Act”), in certain circumstances, has become more problematic than
imaginable at its creation.19 Indiana was among the first states to
address growing concerns about medical malpractice claims, in part by
introducing a prerequisite Panel requirement.20 Before focusing on the
prescreening Panel process, Part II.A briefly discusses the history of the
Act, including the purpose for its creation and the Act’s three main
components.21 Second, Part II.B explains how a Panel is formed, the
composition of a Panel, how a medical malpractice claim moves through
the Panel process, and duties of medical malpractice attorneys, parties,
panelists, and trial courts that will gain jurisdiction of the suit after the
Panel process.22 Next, Part II.C explores Indiana case law that addresses
the Panel requirement, including two conflicting decisions from the
16
See infra Part III (analyzing the implications and inconsistencies of Miller v. Memorial
Hospital of South Bend and K.D. v. Chambers, the discretion of trial judges, and how alreadyavailable trial rules are used in the Panel process).
17
See infra Part IV (proposing a statute to add to the Panel chapter of the Act, providing
support and reasoning for the proposed statute, and addressing the arguments against its
inclusion).
18
See infra Part IV.B (explaining how the proposed statute can be used as a tool to
medical malpractice plaintiffs in order to fully adjudicate their claims based on all available
evidence that K.D. v. Chambers excludes).
19
See infra Part II.A (reviewing the purposes for the Act’s creation, such as rising health
care costs and medical malpractice insurance, the Act’s goals, and generally how a claim
works its way through the process, from the time a plaintiff files a proposed complaint,
through the Panel process, and up until the trial court gains jurisdiction of the case).
20
See infra notes 30–33 (examining the concerns with medical malpractice claims in
Indiana, such as some medical providers refusing to perform certain high risk procedures
for fear of the patient later filing a lawsuit, and the three major reforms created by the Act).
21
See id. (providing an overview of the reasons the Act was created and its three major
components: a comprehensive damage cap, the patient’s compensation fund, and the
prerequisite Panel requirement).
22
See infra Part II.B (explaining how a Panel is formed, the duties of the panelists and
parties, the requirements to complete the Panel process, and the role of the trial court
during the Panel process).
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Indiana Supreme Court and Indiana Court of Appeals, Miller v. Memorial
Hospital of South Bend and K.D. v. Chambers.23 Last, Part II.D explains the
trial rules relevant to the Panel process, as well as the role of trial judges,
including judicial discretion to determine evidentiary issues that arise
after a Panel renders an opinion.24
A. The Enactment of the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act
Early in 1975, Indiana was facing a growing health care crisis.25 The
price of medical malpractice insurance was quickly rising, in sync with
the number of malpractice claims being filed.26 It was becoming
increasingly more difficult for health care providers to obtain
malpractice insurance; the insurance companies stopped providing this
type of coverage in Indiana, and this situation even caused the medical
providers to stop performing certain medical procedures for fear of
litigation.27 Indiana Governor Otis R. Bowen, a medical doctor, called for
reform of the tort system for medical malpractice claims.28 Governor
See infra Part II.C (discussing Miller v. Memorial Hospital of South Bend and K.D. v.
Chambers).
24
See infra Part II.D (explaining several relevant evidentiary and trial rules that are used
during the Panel process and the role of the trial court during and after the process).
25
See Bruce D. Jones, Note, Unfair and Harsh Results of Contributory Negligence Lives in
Indiana: The Indiana Medical Malpractice System and the Indiana Comparative Fault Act, 6 IND.
HEALTH L. REV. 107, 108 (2009) (stating the Act was passed “in response to the growing
health care crisis the state was facing”).
26
See infra note 28 and accompanying text (providing excerpts from Governor Bowen’s
speech to the General Assembly, where he called for legislative reform of the health care
delivery system); see also Scott A. DeVries, Note, Medical Malpractice Acts’ Statutes of
Limitation as They Apply to Minors: Are They Proper?, 28 IND. L. REV. 413, 416 (1995) (“The
number of claims filed, the average amount awarded, and malpractice insurance premiums
rose significantly between 1970 and 1975.”).
27
See DeVries, supra note 26, at 416 (providing three basic assumptions under which
medical malpractice laws, including Indiana’s, were passed in the 1970s). Devries states:
Medical malpractice statutes were passed based upon assumptions
that: (1) increased insurance premiums created a lack of available
affordable liability insurance; (2) there is a close nexus between
substantive tort law, the tort litigation process and the insurance
industry's decisions regarding the availability and the price of such
insurance; and (3) placing restrictions on the tort liability system will
effectuate a reduction in insurance premiums resulting in an increase
in reasonably priced insurance.
Id.; see also infra note 28 and accompanying text (providing excerpts from Governor
Bowen’s speech to the General Assembly, where he called for legislative reform of the
Indiana health care delivery system).
28
GOVERNOR OTIS R. BOWEN, MESSAGE TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, STATE OF INDIANA,
JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE 31, 35–36 (Jan. 9, 1975). The message includes:
Recently the attention of all Hoosiers has been drawn to a problem of
growing severity which threatens Indiana’s health care delivery
23

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2015

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 49, No. 3 [2015], Art. 14

960

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49

Bowen addressed the Indiana General Assembly, stating, “[t]he solution
to this growing health care crisis is not an easy one . . . and it certainly
will not be gained without a great deal of debate and controversy.”29 In
April of that same year, the General Assembly responded by enacting
the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act.30 Indiana was among the first
states to institute tort reform through a legislative solution to address the
The Act’s
increasing costs of malpractice liability insurance.31
system. . . . The problem—the eroding effect that the shrinking
availability of reasonable medical malpractice insurance is having
upon the quality of and accessibility to proper medical care. The
traditional procedures of medical malpractice settlement and
frequency of malpractice litigation have driven a number of insurance
carriers completely out of the business of writing this coverage. This
lack of reasonably available medical malpractice insurance coverage is
forcing doctors to opt out of certain types of operations or medical
specialties due to their high legal risk. . . . These factors also combine
to drive up the cost of medical care to the patient because the increased
threat of potential legal exposure forces the physicians to practice
“defensive medicine”—that which is carried out with one eye on the
patient and one eye on the courts. . . . The solution to this growing
health care crisis is not an easy one . . . and it certainly will not be one
gained without a great deal of debate and controversy. There are,
however, a number of potential ways by which this problem may be
confronted, and I am certain that a number of proposals will be
introduced before you in this session. . . .
Id. at 35–36. But see Garau Germano Hanley & Pennington, P.C., Indiana Medical Malpractice
Lawyers Know “Defensive Medicine” is More Myth Than Fact, IND. MED. MALPRACTICE LAW.
BLOG (Sept. 8, 2010), http://www.indianapolis-medical-malpractice-lawyer.com/blog/
2010/09/indiana-medical-malpractice-lawyers-know-defensive-medicine-is-more-myththan-fact.shtml, archived at http://perma.cc/FS8E-SKCU (citing a recent Health Affairs
journal study, which “found that the costs of ‘defensive medicine’ have been dramatically
overstated by critics of the malpractice system”).
29
See supra note 28 (providing excerpts of Governor’s Bowen’s Address to the Indiana
General Assembly).
30
Act of Apr. 17, 1975, Pub. L. No. 146-1975, 1975 Ind. Acts 854 (codified as amended at
IND. CODE §§ 27-12-1-1 to 18-2 (1975)). See INDIANA STATE MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, A
HISTORY OF THE MEDICAL LIABILITY ISSUE, INDIANA COMPENSATION ACT FOR PATIENTS (May
2003), available at http://www.ismanet.org/pdf/INCAP_White_Paper.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cc/EH2S-638C (describing the reasons for the Act’s enactment, and
explaining that “[m]edical malpractice is not one problem, but a series of interrelated
problems that involve the regulation and social control of medical practice, quality of care,
insurance markets, consistent assessment of liability in the legal system and the existing
paradigm of societal attitudes toward the practice of medicine”).
31
See James D. Kemper et al., Reform Revisited: A Review of the Indiana Medical Malpractice
Act Ten Years Later, 19 IND. L. REV. 1129, 1129 (1986) (exploring the Indiana General
Assembly’s purpose for enacting the Act); Eleanor D. Kinney, Indiana’s Medical Malpractice
Reform Revisited: A Limited Constitutional Challenge, 31 IND. L. REV. 1043, 1046 (1998)
[hereinafter Indiana’s Medical Malpractice Reform Revisited] (explaining the Indiana General
Assembly’s response to the growing health care crisis); Jones, supra note 25, at 108 (noting
that Indiana was the first state to pass statutory reform through legislative measures).

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol49/iss3/14

Bullock Green: No "New" Breaches: Adding a Section to the Indiana Medical Malpr

2015]

No “New” Breaches

961

overarching goal was to help health care providers maintain insurance
coverage, and in turn, protect the public from decreased services.32 The
Act’s three major components are: (1) a comprehensive damage cap; (2)
a patient’s compensation fund; and (3) a Panel requirement.33
Currently, a patient’s award for damages may not exceed
$1,250,000.34 Liable health care providers are responsible for the first
$250,000, and the remaining amount of damages awarded is payable
from the patient’s compensation fund.35 All qualified insured health care

32
See supra note 28 and accompanying text (discussing Governor Bowen’s call for tort
reform); Kemper et al., supra note 31, at 1129 (explaining the Act’s purpose and the
legislative response); see also Eleanor D. Kinney et al., Indiana’s Medical Malpractice Act:
Results of a Three Year Study, 24 IND. L. REV. 1275, 1277 (1991) [hereinafter Indiana’s Medical
Malpractice Act: Results of a Three Year Study] (discussing the Act’s purpose and stating that
it was to “assure the continued availability of health care services in the state”).
33
See IND. CODE § 34-18-14-3 (2014) (providing the maximum amount of damages
recoverable under the Act); id. § 34-18-6-1 (creating the patient’s compensation fund); id.
§ 34-18-10-1 (establishing “medical review panels to review proposed medical malpractice
complaints against health care providers”); see also Indiana’s Medical Malpractice Reform
Revisited, supra note 31, at 1046 (explaining the comprehensive damage cap, patient’s
compensation fund, and the Panel requirement of the Act).
34
See IND. CODE § 34-18-14-3(a)(3) (2014) (referring to acts of malpractice that occurred
from July 1, 1999 to present). Additionally, the Indiana General Assembly is currently
considering a Senate Bill that will require all claims be paid every three months, instead of
every six months. S.B. 56, 118th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2014). Over the past
several years, the damage cap has increased. See id. § 34-18-14-3(a)(2)–(3) (stating that acts
of malpractice before January 1, 1990 were capped at $500,000, and acts before July 1, 1999
at $750,000). Further, the Indiana Department of Insurance (“IDOI”) maintains a website
where anyone can search for any health care provider’s malpractice history. See INDIANA
PATIENT’S COMPENSATION FUND, http://www.indianapcf.com (last visited Mar. 5, 2015),
archived at http://perma.cc/8P4Y-NHB5 (last visited Mar. 5, 2015) (providing a search
engine where users may search by provider or claim for more information on medical
malpractice suits brought against health care providers in Indiana).
35
See IND. CODE § 34-18-14-3(c) (2014) (“[a]ny amount due from a judgment or
settlement that is in excess of the total liability of all liable health care providers . . . shall be
paid from the patient’s compensation fund”). Many plaintiffs have argued that the current
damage cap leaves a large gap between the amount of loss suffered by the patient and the
amount the plaintiff can be awarded in a successful medical malpractice case. See Patients
Blast Indiana Law That Protects Doctors: Patient’s Family Fights Malpractice Act, INDY
CHANNEL (May 20, 2011), http://www.theindychannel.com/lifestyle/health/patientsblast-indiana-law-that-protects-doctors,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/W5PB-LCX2
(recounting a malpractice plaintiff’s unhappiness with the $250,000 damage cap for
physicians, when the patient’s “medical expenses top $1.8 million and his lost income totals
more than $4 million”); Marc Chase, Millions in Malpractice Claims to be Paid by State Fund,
Not “Nose Doc”, HAMMOND COMM. NEWS (June 25, 2013, 7:15 PM),
http://www.nwitimes.com/ news/local/lake/hammond/millions-in-malpractice-claimsto-be-paid-by-state-fund/ article_8a37a7bf-e3c2-5408-a554-7ec4304ccdb9.html, archived at
http://perma.cc/DU4R-58KT (detailing the highly-publicized lawsuits against a former
Merrillville, Indiana physician in which the patient’s compensation fund was used to settle
approximately 300 suits totaling $66 million).
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providers in the state are assessed an annual special surcharge, which is
paid into the patient’s compensation fund, in order to cover damages
awarded for malpractice.36
The Panel requirement is a prerequisite to filing a medical
malpractice suit against health care providers in Indiana.37 It serves as a
tool to screen medical malpractice claims before they are filed in court,
with one of its goals clearly designed to distinguish the meritorious
claims from the frivolous.38 The Panel requirement is also meant to
speed up the overall disposition of malpractice claims, and control costs
for all parties by providing expert opinions early in the process.39 By
design, the Panel provides parties with a quick, informal decision on
liability before the claim may be filed in open court.40 Many critics note
See IND. CODE § 34-18-5-1 (2014) (“[t]o create a source of money for the patient’s
compensation fund, an annual surcharge shall be levied on all health care providers in
Indiana”); see also American Medical Association, State Patient Compensation Funds (Feb.
2008),
available
at
http://www.scribd.com/doc/181171839/AMA-state-PatientCompensation-Funds#scribd, archived at http://perma.cc/2T4Q-CR2G (describing
Indiana’s patient compensation fund by stating that it “is funded through annual
surcharges assessed against all qualified health care providers”).
37
See IND. CODE § 34-18-8-4 (2014) (providing that actions against health care providers
cannot be commenced in an Indiana court before a proposed complaint is presented to a
Panel and the Panel gives an opinion). But see id. § 34-18-8-5 (noting that this prerequisite is
not a complete mandate, as parties can agree to bypass the Panel review); id. § 34-18-8-6(a)
(providing that claims for less than $15,000 do not have to be presented to a Panel).
38
See Kemper et al., supra note 31, at 1129 (explaining the Indiana General Assembly’s
purpose and goals for the Act’s creation); Sebastian Kitchen, Medical Review Panels Approved
by Kentucky Senate Panel, COURIER-J. (Feb. 12, 2014), http://www.courier-journal.com/
story/news/politics/ky-legislature/2014/02/12/medical-review-panels-approved-bykentucky-senate-panel/5424389/, archived at http://perma.cc/765P-FN62 (discussing the
Kentucky Senate Panel’s recent vote to approve the use of medical review panels, with Dr.
Glenn Loomis, CEO of St. Elizabeth Physicians, stating, “Indiana has used review panels
for years to reduce malpractice claims”). However, not everyone in Kentucky is
welcoming of the proposed bill to enact a prerequisite Panel requirement similar to
Indiana’s. See Jan Scherrer, Jan Scherrer: Bill for Medical Review Panel Blocks Our Access to
Courts, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER (Feb. 19, 2014), http://www.kentucky.com/2014/
02/19/3096228_jan-scherrer-bill-for-medical.html?rh=1, archived at http://perma.cc/S3Y74SSD (opposing the proposed medical malpractice reform in Kentucky that resembles
Indiana law by asserting “Indiana is the only neighboring state that uses review panels,
and Indiana’s nursing home care is abominable”).
39
See Kemper et al., supra note 31, at 1129 (explaining the Indiana General Assembly’s
purpose and goals for the Act’s creation); Catherine Schick Hurlbut, Note, Constitutionality
of the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act: Re-Evaluated, 19 VAL. U. L. REV. 493, 494 (1985)
(asserting that the legislative intent of the Panel process was to decrease delays in the
disposition of medical malpractice claims).
40
See IND. CODE § 34-18-10-20 (2014) (“[m]eetings shall be informal”); Kemper et al.,
supra note 31, at 1142 (“[t]he opinion of the panel is no more than an opinion”); id. at 1133,
1141 (discussing that “[t]he panel is not bound by formalities,” and additionally, that the
“[t]he entire panel process should take nine months” but that “reality is much different
from the mechanism set out in the Act”).
36
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that the reality of the Panel’s place in medical malpractice claims is much
more.41 The Act’s statutory requirements for the Panel process impact
attorneys, parties, panelists, and trial judges from the proposed
complaint, through discovery, during trial, and even after a final
judgment is entered and the decision is appealed.42
B. A Walk Through the Panel Process
Chapter ten of the Act sets out specific guidelines for the Panel
process that parties must follow before a medical malpractice claim may
be pursued in a trial court.43 First, a claimant files a proposed complaint
with the Indiana Department of Insurance (“IDOI”) commissioner and
serves all parties to be included in the suit.44 Next, the claimant requests
the formation of a Panel, which will evaluate the plaintiff’s proposed
complaint.45 All parties to the suit and the IDOI receive notice of this
See Kemper et al., supra note 31, at 1133 (“The nine-month statutory timetable is rarely,
if ever, met.”); William A. Ramsey & Catherine Hart, DTCI: The Medical Review Panel
Process, IND. LAW. (Sept. 11, 2013), http://www.theindianalawyer.com/dtci-the-medicalreview-panel-process/PARAMS/article/32336, archived at http://perma.cc/M3AZ-PF9H
(“The medical review panel process plays an important role in medical malpractice
litigation, including separating meritorious claims from meritless claims.”); How to File a
Claim with a Medical Review Panel, BAKER & GILCHRIST, http://www.bakerand
gilchrist.com/legal-services/medical-malpractice/medical-review-panel/ (last visited Mar.
2, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/UHT2-HK3D (explaining the Panel process for
medical malpractice claims in Indiana, articulating “[t]he panel’s report is admissible as
evidence in the case, and it could carry a great deal of weight with a jury” and “the
selection of the medical review panel process is critical to the outcome of [a] claim”); Garau
Germano Hanley & Pennington, P.C., Indiana Court of Appeals Affirms Medical Malpractice
Verdict, IND. MED. MALPRACTICE L. BLOG (May 18, 2012), http://www.indianapolismedical-malpractice-lawyer.com/blog/2012/05/indiana-court-of-appeals-affirms-medicalmalpractice-verdict.shtml, archived at http://perma.cc/5CQ9-7NG9 (highlighting frequent
problems with medical malpractice cases, such as when “panels ignore the limit on their
power,” and further stating that “when the physicians on the medical review panel
overstep their bounds by resolving conflicts in the evidence, they almost always resolve
them in favor of their fellow physicians”).
42
See infra Part II.B (explaining the step-by-step process required under chapter ten of
the Act and the roles of medical malpractice parties, attorneys, panelists, and trial judges).
43
See infra notes 44–71 and accompanying text (reviewing the statutory requirements in
chapter ten of the Act, focusing predominantly on the Panel process).
44
See IND. CODE § 34-18-7-3(b) (2014) (clarifying that proposed complaints are
“considered filed when a copy of the proposed complaint is delivered or mailed by
registered or certified mail to the commissioner”); see also id. § 34-18-7-3(a) (“The filing of a
proposed complaint tolls the applicable statute of limitations to and including a period of
ninety (90) days following the receipt of the opinion of the medical review panel by the
claimant.”).
45
See id. § 34-18-10-2 (“[n]o earlier than twenty (20) days after the filing of a proposed
complaint, either party may request the formation of a medical review panel”); Jones, supra
note 25, at 113 (describing the Panel process, including the statutory requirement that
parties may convene a Panel twenty days after filing a complaint).
41

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2015

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 49, No. 3 [2015], Art. 14

964

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49

action.46 Although each requirement of Panel selection includes a
relatively short time restriction, given the numerous steps, the process of
selecting a Panel should ideally span seventy to ninety days.47
Each Panel includes one attorney and three health care providers.48
The attorney acts as chairman of the Panel, serves in an advisory
capacity, and does not vote.49 The chairman, using “his or her
professional experience as an attorney,” is tasked with “advising the
three medical professionals on the panel about the law.”50 The parties
select the chairman, who expedites the selection of Panel members,
convenes the Panel, may remove panelists, and oversees the Panel’s
review of the proposed complaint and evidence submitted by the
parties.51
See IND. CODE § 34-18-10-2 (2014) (explaining that the party requesting the Panel must
do so “by serving a request by registered or certified mail upon all parties and the
commissioner”).
47
See Hurlbut, supra note 39, at 497 (“[T]he selection process encompasses seventy to
ninety days from the request for a formation.”). More information on the Panel process is
available on the IDOI website.
See Medical Malpractice, IND. DEPT. OF INS.,
http://www.in.gov/idoi/2614.htm#1 (last visited Mar. 5, 2015), archived at
http://perma.cc/4H6B-NF77 (providing consumer information for medical malpractice
complaints, such as the filing procedure and attorney referrals).
48
See IND. CODE § 34-18-10-3 (2014) (“A medical review panel consists of one (1) attorney
and three (3) health care providers.”); Hurlbut, supra note 39, at 496 (stating that Panels
consist of three health care providers and one attorney).
49
See IND. CODE § 34-18-10-3 (2014) (“The attorney member of the medical review panel
shall act as the chairman of the panel and in an advisory capacity but may not vote.”); see
also Hurlbut, supra note 39, at 496–97 (explaining that the chairman “sits in an advisory
capacity” and “has no vote in the [P]anel’s decision”).
50
See Sherrow v. GYN, Ltd., 745 N.E.2d 880, 884 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (discussing a
chairman’s role in advising panelists of the validity of legal arguments raised by parties in
panel submissions); IND. CODE § 34-18-10-16(a) (2014) (“The chairman may remove a
member of the panel if the chairman decides that the member is not fulfilling the duties
imposed upon the panel members by this chapter.”); id. § 34-18-10-17(d) (“The chairman
shall ensure that before the panel gives its expert opinion . . . each panel member has the
opportunity to review every item of evidence submitted by the parties.”).
51
See supra note 50 and accompanying text (explaining that the attorney member serves
in an advisory capacity); IND. CODE § 34-18-10-4 (2014) (providing the process for selecting
a Panel). The process is as follows:
A medical review panel shall be selected in the following manner: (1)
Within fifteen (15) days after the filing of a request for formation of a
medical review panel . . . the parties shall select a panel chairman by
agreement. If no agreement on a panel chairman can be reached,
either party may request the clerk of the supreme court to draw at
random a list of five (5) names of attorneys who: (A) are qualified to
practice; (B) are presently on the rolls of the supreme court; and (C)
maintain offices in the county of venue designated in the proposed
complaint or in a contiguous county. (2) Before selecting the random
list, the clerk shall collect a twenty-five dollar ($25) medical review
panel selection fee from the party making the request for the formation
46
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All health care providers licensed in Indiana are eligible for selection
to serve as members of a Panel.52 Each party (or one party per side)
selects one health care provider within fifteen days of the chairman
selection, and those two providers select the third panelist.53 If a
defendant health care provider is a specialist, at least one of the panelists
must specialize in the same area.54 Panelists are paid a fee for
participating in the process, as well as travel expenses.55 The side whose
favor the majority opinion is written is responsible for payment, or the

of the random list. (3) The clerk shall notify the parties, and the parties
shall then strike names alternatively with the plaintiff striking first
until one (1) name remains. . . . (5) If a party does not strike a name
within five (5) days after receiving notice from the clerk: (A) the
opposing party shall, in writing, request the clerk to strike for the
party; and (B) the clerk shall strike for that party.
Id.
Id. § 34-18-10-5. There are many cases addressing which health care providers fall
within the statutory definition and how this is to be determined. See, e.g., Harlett v. St.
Vincent Hosps. & Health Svcs., 748 N.E.2d 921, 925 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (reversing the trial
court’s determination that registered or licensed practical nurses were not health care
providers under the Act); Guinn v. Light, 536 N.E.2d 546, 546 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989)
(clarifying that the Panel “can act only if the health care provider before it is ‘qualified’
under the Act”); Michael W. Hoskins, Court Clarifies Ruling on Medical Review Panel Process,
IND. LAW. (July 8, 2011), http://www.theindianalawyer.com/court-clarifies-ruling-onmedical-review-panel-process/PARAMS/article/26723, archived at http://perma.cc/7V9RCDY3 (evaluating the Honore case and determining that “[r]egistered nurses or licensed
practical nurses are included in the statutory definition of health care providers”).
53
See IND. CODE § 34-18-10-6 (2014) (“Each party to the action has the right to select one
(1) health care provider, and upon selection, the two (2) health care providers thus selected
shall select the third panelist.”); id. § 34-18-10-7 (“[if] there are multiple plaintiffs or
defendants, only one (1) health care provider shall be selected per side,” and “[t]he
plaintiff . . . has the right to select one (1) health care provider and the defendant . . . has the
right to select one (1) health care provider”).
54
See id. § 34-18-10-8 (explaining that two of the panelists must be a member of the same
profession as the defendant, and if the defendant’s area of practice is a specialty, two of the
panelists must also specialize in the same area); see also Ryan M. Siedermann et al., Closing
the Gate on Questionable Expert Witness Testimony: A Proposal to Institute Expert Review
Panels, 33 S.U. L. REV. 29, 79 (2005) (proposing a model rule for the creation of expert
review panels in the future, which in part references language from Indiana’s Act,
including “[t]he expert members of the panel must be selected from a pool of individuals
qualified in the same specialty as the expert whose testimony or evidence is to be
reviewed”).
55
See IND. CODE § 34-18-10-25 (2014) (explaining that health care providers receive $350
and reasonable travel expenses, the Panel chairman receives $250 per diem, with a limit set
of $2000 and reasonable travel expenses); see also Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp., Inc., 404
N.E.2d 585, 596 (Ind. 1980) (holding that the panelist compensation provision of the Act is
constitutional due to the low amount of compensation required). But see INDIANA’S
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACT: RESULTS OF A THREE YEAR STUDY, supra note 32, at 1302
(characterizing the Panel process as a “costly” proceeding).
52

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2015

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 49, No. 3 [2015], Art. 14

966

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49

chairman may decide to divide the cost if the Panel does not render a
uniform or unanimous opinion.56
Next, the parties begin discovery and must promptly submit written
evidence for the Panel’s consideration.57 Evidence may consist of:
medical charts, x-rays, lab tests, excerpts from treatises, depositions of
witnesses including the parties, and any other form allowable by the
panel.58 Before considering any evidence, the panelists must take an
oath to perform to the best of their ability.59 By statute, the Panel should
render its expert opinion within 180 days of the selection of the last
member.60 However, there are commonly used exceptions to this rule,
which can heavily impact the length of time before a Panel actually
renders an opinion.61
See IND. CODE § 34-18-10-25(d) (2014) (“Fees of the panel, including travel expenses
and other expenses of the review, shall be paid by the side whose favor the majority
opinion is written[,]” and “[i]f there is no majority opinion, each side shall pay fifty percent
(50%) of the cost.”).
57
See id. § 34-18-10-17(a) (“[E]vidence in written form to be considered by the medical
review panel shall be promptly submitted by the respective parties.”); see also Sherrow v.
GYN, Ltd., 745 N.E.2d 880, 884 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (“[P]arties are permitted to submit
evidence to the panel.”).
58
See IND. CODE § 34-18-10-17(b) (2014) (explaining the permissible forms of evidence
that may be submitted to the Panel for review); see also Sherrow, 745 N.E.2d at 884–85
(determining that panelists “may consult with other medical authorities and reports by
other health care providers); Kranda v. Houser-Norberg Med. Corp., 419 N.E.2d 1024,
1032–33 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (explaining that this provision should not be so narrowly
construed to determine that panelists may only consult the medical authorities outlined in
the provision).
59
See IND. CODE § 34-18-10-17(e) (2014) (supplying the suggested oath or affirmation to
be recited by the panelists). The oath states:
I (swear) (affirm) under penalties of perjury that I will well and truly
consider the evidence submitted by the parties; that I will render my
opinion without bias, based upon the evidence submitted by the
parties, and that I have not and will not communicate with any party
or representative of a party before rendering my opinion, except as
authorized by law.
Id.; see also Tucker v. Harrison, 973 N.E.2d 46, 54–55 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (discussing that
the oath also includes rendering an “opinion without bias” and holding that all health care
providers are not generally biased merely because they have a financial interest in the
patient’s compensation fund).
60
See IND. CODE § 34-18-10-13(a) (2014) (providing the time for issuance of an opinion by
the Panel); Stephen L. Williams, Indiana’s Medical Malpractice Act—The Developing Law—,
RES GESTAE 494, 497 (Apr. 1984) (“One of the most important time limits within the Act is
that the panel must render its written opinion within 180 days after the last panel member
is selected.”).
61
See Beemer v. Elskens, 677 N.E.2d 1117, 1119 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (explaining that if an
opinion is not rendered within the requisite time frame, the panel must provide an
explanation for the delay and attempt to move the process forward in a reasonable
manner); Gleason v. Bush, 664 N.E.2d 1183, 1185 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (explaining that if a
panel is unable to comply with the requisite time frame, sanctions are not automatically
56
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Within thirty days of reviewing all evidence, the Panel renders its
opinion in writing.62 The Panel’s sole duty is to give an expert opinion as
to whether the evidence supports a conclusion that the defendant(s)
acted or failed to act within the appropriate standard of care as charged
in the proposed complaint.63 Under the statutory time limitations set out
in the Act, the entire Panel process should be complete approximately
nine months after the filing of a proposed complaint.64
triggered); Lester F. Murphy, Pitfalls in Medical Malpractice Panel Practice, RES GESTAE 178,
180 (Oct. 1985) (discussing the difficulty of meeting this deadline because of delays due to
scheduling conflicts and geographical location of the panelists); Hurlbut, supra note 39, at
500–01 (concluding that “few claims receive a review panel decision within the nine month
prescribed limitation”).
62
See IND. CODE § 34-18-10-22 (2014); see also Murphy, supra note 61, at 180 (“The panel
normally reaches its opinion the same night that it convenes”). However, the statutory
time limitation is rarely met. See Hurlbut, supra note 39, at 500–01 (concluding that few
claims meet the statutory time limitations). One study found that the average timeframe
from the time a proposed complaint was filed and the Panel rendering an opinion was
thirty-two months. See Indiana’s Medical Malpractice Act: Results of a Three Year Study, supra
note 32, at 1296 (reporting results from a study based on evidence collected from 1975
through 1988).
63
IND. CODE § 34-18-10-22(b (2014). The available opinions are whether:
(1) The evidence supports the conclusion that the defendant or
defendants failed to comply with the appropriate standard of care as
charged in the complaint; (2) The evidence does not support the
conclusion that the defendant or defendants failed to comply with the
appropriate standard of care as charged in the complaint; (3) There is a
material issue of fact, not requiring expert opinion, bearing on liability
for consideration by the court or jury; or (4) The conduct complained
of was or was not a factor of the resultant damages. If so, whether the
plaintiff suffered: (A) any disability and the extent and duration of the
disability; and (B) any permanent impairment and the percentage of
the impairment.
Id.; see Bonnes v. Feldner, 642 N.E.2d 217, 219 (Ind. 1994) (“The panel has the sole duty to
express its expert opinion or opinions as to whether or not the evidence supports the
conclusion that the defendant acted or failed to act within the appropriate standard of care
as charged in the complaint.”); Kranda v. Houser-Norborg Med. Corp., 419 N.E.2d 1024,
1033 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (stating that the panel’s “purpose is to conduct a rational inquiry
into the extent and source of the patient’s injury for the purpose of forming its expert
opinion”); Indiana’s Medical Malpractice Act: Results of a Three Year Study, supra note 32, at
1279 (discussing the Panel’s duty); Hurlbut, supra note 39, at 498 (explaining that a Panel’s
“sole duty is to determine the validity of the patient’s complaint against the defendant
health care provider”).
64
See Hurlbut, supra note 39, at 498 (totaling all time requirements of the Panel process,
including ninety days for Panel selection and 180 days for the Panel to render its opinion).
But see Mooney v. Anonymous M.D. 4, 991 N.E.2d 565, 578 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (“The Act
anticipates that a panel might not always be able to meet the deadline.”). See also IND.
CODE § 34-18-10-13(b) (2014) (“If the panel has not given an opinion within the time
allowed under subsection (a), the panel shall submit a report to the commissioner, stating
the reasons for the delay.”); Beemer, 677 N.E.2d at 1120 (explaining that the Panel must
submit an explanation for the delay and make a reasonable effort to expedite the process);
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Although the Panel review is a statutory requirement, Panel
decisions are admissible, but not binding, upon the court.65
Additionally, panelists are immune from civil liability concerning their
duties on a Panel.66 The Panel opinion is “not conclusive, and either
party, at the party’s cost, has the right to call any member of the medical
review panel as a witness.”67 Quite often, defendant health care
providers that receive a unanimous Panel opinion will likely file a
motion for summary judgment.68

Gleason, 664 N.E.2d at 1187 (determining that if a Panel does not comply with the time
requirements of the Act, sanctions are not automatically triggered, but it must explain the
reason for delay and make a reasonable attempt to expedite the process).
65
See IND. CODE § 34-18-10-23 (2014) (“A report of the expert opinion reached by the
medical review panel is admissible as evidence in any action subsequently brought by the
claimant in a court of law.”); see also Smith v. Dermatology Assocs. of Ft. Wayne, P.C., 977
N.E.2d 1, 4 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (discussing that the defendant health care provider
admitted evidence of a favorable Panel opinion at trial).
66
See IND. CODE § 34-18-10-24 (2014) (“A panelist has absolute immunity from civil
liability for all communications, findings, opinions, and conclusions made in the course
and scope of duties prescribed by this article.”); see also Siedermann, supra note 54, at 81
(proposing a model rule for the creation of expert review panels in the future, which in part
references language from Indiana’s Act, including “[a] panelist has absolute immunity
from civil liability for all communications, findings, opinions, and conclusions made in the
course and scope of duties . . . ”).
67
See IND. CODE § 34-18-10-23 (2014) (discussing the admissibility of the Panel’s report at
trial and the parties’ ability to call Panel members as witnesses); Haas v. Bush, 894 N.E.2d
229, 235 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that Panelists must appear and testify if called by
either party, and “any alleged frailties in the panel opinion [can be] exposed” by the trial
judge); Dickey v. Long, 575 N.E.2d 339, 340 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (finding that under no
circumstances should the Panel’s report be determined inadmissible, because the trier of
fact can judge the credibility and issues with the Panel at trial).
68
See Smith, 977 N.E.2d at 5 (quoting Mills v. Berrios, 851 N.E.2d 1066, 1070 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2006)). The court states:
When a medical review panel issues an opinion in favor of the
physician, the plaintiff must present expert medical testimony to
negate the panel’s opinion. If the plaintiff fails to provide sufficient
expert testimony, summary judgment should be granted in favor of the
defendants. However, a medical malpractice case based upon
negligence is rarely appropriate for disposal by summary judgment,
particularly when the critical issue is whether the defendant exercised
the appropriate standard of care under the circumstances. This issue is
generally inappropriate for resolution as a matter of law and is a
question that should be reserved for the trier of fact.
Id.; see also Mills, 851 N.E.2d at 1070 (“When a medical review panel issues an opinion in
favor of the physician, the plaintiff must present expert medical testimony to negate the
panel’s opinion. If the plaintiff fails to provide sufficient expert testimony, summary
judgment should be granted in favor of the defendants.” (citations omitted)).
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Until the Panel issues an opinion, the trial court has no jurisdiction to
hear and adjudicate the malpractice claim.69 This statute ensures that
one of the Indiana General Assembly’s main goals for creating the Panel
requirement, prescreening of proposed medical malpractice claims, is
met.70 However, it has wide discretion to impose sanctions for failure to
comply with the Act’s prerequisite Panel process.71 Next, case law
interpreting the statutes concerning the Panel process and the additional
rules created by the courts are discussed, with the primary focus on
Miller v. Memorial Hospital of South Bend and K.D. v. Chambers.72
C. Defining the Parameters of the Panel Requirement with Miller and
Chambers
The Act has been challenged on many grounds since it became law
in 1975.73 The Indiana Supreme Court has, on more than one occasion,
upheld the constitutionality of the Act.74 Other challenges address the

69
See Griffith v. Jones, 602 N.E.2d 107, 111 (Ind. 1992) (discussing trial court’s lack of
jurisdiction to instruct Panel concerning definitions of terms and phrases used in the Act);
K.D. v. Chambers, 951 N.E.2d 855, 858 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (holding that the trial court had
no jurisdiction to hear and adjudicate the case until the Panel issues its opinion). But see
Harlett v. St. Vincent Hosps. & Health Svcs., 748 N.E.2d 921, 924 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001)
(determining that the trial court did have jurisdiction to make a preliminary determination
of law concerning the formation of a panel).
70
See supra Part II.A (discussing the Indiana General Assembly’s purpose for enacting a
statute that requires medical malpractice prescreening Panels).
71
See IND. CODE § 34-18-10-14 (2014) (“A party, attorney, or panelist who fails to act as
required by this chapter without good cause shown is subject to mandate or appropriate
sanctions upon application to the court designated in the proposed complaint as having
jurisdiction.”); see also Doe Corp. v. Honore, 950 N.E.2d 722, 728 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011)
(determining that the trial court had discretion to determine appropriate sanctions upon a
party failing to act as required); Harlett, 748 N.E.2d at 924 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (stating that
the trial court had limited jurisdiction and authority to make certain preliminary
determinations of law in medical malpractice cases); Sherrow v. GYN, Ltd., 745 N.E.2d 880,
884 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (finding that trial courts have subject matter jurisdiction “in cases
where a panel member is alleged to have failed to carry out required statutory duties”).
72
See infra Part II.C (discussing the various challenges to the Panel requirement of the
Act, and the two cases that directly address the sufficiency of submissions to a Panel:
Miller v. Memorial Hospital of South Bend and K.D. v. Chambers).
73
See Indiana’s Medical Malpractice Act: Results of a Three Year Study, supra note 32, at
1281, 1284 (informing that “[s]ince 1975, over fifty judicial decisions have interpreted
provisions of the Act[,]” and that “Indiana courts have played, and continue to play, a
dynamic role in defining the function and extent of the Act’s provisions”).
74
See Cha v. Warnick, 476 N.E.2d 109, 114 (Ind. 1995) (upholding the constitutionality of
the Act by finding that the Panel proceedings were not an unreasonable delay); Johnson v.
St. Vincent Hosp., 404 N.E.2d 585, 595 (Ind. 1980) (holding that the Panel requirement of
the Act did not create impermissible delay and expense, therefore it is constitutional).
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trial court’s jurisdiction and behavior of panelists.75 However, two major
decisions address issues with the Act’s prerequisite Panel requirement—
Miller v. Memorial Hospital of South Bend and K.D. v. Chambers.76
In Miller, the Indiana Supreme Court addressed whether the
plaintiffs’ proposed complaint to the Panel “sufficiently articulated two
separate injuries.”77 The plaintiffs, parents of an infant son, alleged that
the child was injured during birth.78 After the parents settled their claim
against the doctor, the hospital argued that it could not be liable because
75
See Mooney v. Anonymous M.D. 4, 991 N.E.2d 565, 575 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013)
(establishing that it was within the trial court’s discretion whether to dismiss a proposed
complaint under the Act and the decision is a “question of law and fact that may be
preliminarily determined by the trial court in the exercise of its discretion after a hearing”);
Honore, 950 N.E.2d at 728 (determining that the trial court did have subject matter
jurisdiction to issue a preliminary determination of law regarding the validity of a Panel
opinion); Harlett, 748 N.E.2d at 925 (holding that the trial court and court of appeals have
jurisdiction to determine preliminary issues raised by the parties during the panel process);
Gleason v. Bush, 664 N.E.2d 1183, 1186 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (explaining that the trial court
has authority to impose sanctions upon parties that fail to comply with Act’s requirement);
St. Anthony Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Smith, 592 N.E.2d 732, 736 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that
the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over a medical malpractice action where
the original complaint was filed in trial court before the proposed complaint was filed with
the medical review panel and before the Panel rendered an opinion); Galindo v.
Christensen, 569 N.E.2d 702, 705–06 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (discussing the trial court’s
authority to impose sanctions when a party “fails to act as required by [the Act] without
good cause shown”); Kranda v. Houser-Norborg Med. Corp., 419 N.E.2d 1024, 1034 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1981) (challenging two Panel members’ decision being based on casual
conversations with other physicians).
76
See Miller v. Mem’l Hosp. of S. Bend, 679 N.E.2d 1329, 1331 (Ind. 1997) (challenging
the proper articulation of two separate instances of malpractice alleged in a proposed
complaint); K.D. v. Chambers, 951 N.E.2d 855, 859 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (challenging
whether additional breaches discovered after the Panel opinion may be raised at trial).
Other cases have addressed the Panel requirement, but not as in depth as the cases
discussed in the text of this Note. See McGill v. Ling, 801 N.E.2d 678, 682 (Ind. Ct. App.
2004) (“[A] medical malpractice action may not be brought against a health care provider
until the claimant's proposed complaint has been filed with the [IDOI] and an opinion has
been issued by a medical review panel.”); Winona Mem’l Hosp. v. Kuester, 737 N.E.2d 824,
827 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (“Submission of a proposed complaint to a medical review panel is
a condition precedent to filing a medical malpractice claim in Indiana.”).
77
See Miller, 679 N.E.2d at 1330–32 (explaining the facts of the case and the issue
addressed by the court). In Miller, the plaintiffs alleged that their infant son suffered
injuries caused by the conduct of a doctor and the hospital. Id. at 1330. The plaintiffs
settled with the doctor for the statutory maximum, and pursued their claim against the
hospital. Id. The hospital argued that it could not be liable for the same injury that the
plaintiffs already received damages for from the doctor. Id. at 1331. The plaintiffs claimed
that they alleged two separate injuries, prenatal injuries by the doctor and postnatal
injuries by the hospital; therefore, they still had a claim against the hospital for the
separate, postnatal injury. Id.
78
See id. at 1330 (explaining the facts of the case that caused the plaintiffs to seek relief
through the Act, including the injuries the plaintiffs alleged the health care providers
caused to their infant son).
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the plaintiffs would be compensated twice for the same injury.79 The
plaintiffs argued that the complaint alleged separate injuries against the
doctor and the hospital.80 The court held that the plaintiffs’ claim against
the hospital was articulated clear enough to continue the suit,
determining “the plaintiffs’ action is [not] restricted by the substance of
the submissions presented to the medical review panel.”81 The court
reasoned that no requirement exists that requires plaintiffs “to fully
explicate and provide particulars or legal contentions regarding the
claim.”82 Furthermore, the court opined “the complaints utilize separate
counts to assert their claims against the two defendants and specify
differing dates for each defendant’s alleged acts of malpractice.”83
In a recent Indiana Court of Appeals decision, K.D. v. Chambers, the
court addressed whether a plaintiff may raise additional, separate
breaches in the standard of care by a medical provider at trial, if the
plaintiff did not previously present evidence of the alleged breaches to
the Panel.84 The mother of a young boy brought suit against a hospital
and nurse, alleging the nurse administered excessive amounts of
medication to the boy.85 Relying on the lack of reference to an additional
breach in the plaintiff’s proposed complaint, the court determined that at
trial, the plaintiff may only present evidence of the breach articulated in
the proposed complaint.86
79
See Miller, 679 N.E.2d at 1331 (articulating the arguments made by the parties that
were considered by the court, specifically that the plaintiffs argued that they alleged two
separate injuries, prenatal injuries by the doctor and postnatal injuries by the hospital, thus
they still had a claim against the hospital for the separate, postnatal injury).
80
See id. (reviewing the procedural facts of the case and the arguments made by the
plaintiff in response to the remaining defendant health care provider’s arguments).
81
See id. at 1332 (providing the court’s holding in Miller, where it held “the plaintiffs’
action is [not] restricted by the substance of the submissions presented to the medical
review panel”).
82
See id. (explaining the court’s reasoning for holding that the plaintiffs sufficiently
articulated a separate breach against the remaining defendant health care provider).
83
See id. (finding that the plaintiffs clearly established that they were asserting separate
and distinct claims against the two defendants).
84
See K.D. v. Chambers, 951 N.E.2d 855, 858 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (explaining the court’s
holding and reasoning). In Chambers, a young boy was taken to a hospital after bumping
his head. Id. While being treated, a nurse administered an excessive dose of Benadryl to
the boy, which caused an adverse reaction. Id. After being released from the hospital, the
boy continued to suffer from a tremor, which his parents believed was a result of the
overdose. Id. The parents filed a proposed complaint, alleging carelessness and negligence
of the hospital, including the nurse, two physicians, and other employees. Id. In the
proposed complaint, the plaintiffs “did not specify any overdose or breaches of the
standard of care other than the overdose of Benadryl.” Id. at 859.
85
See Chambers, 951 N.E.2d at 858 (explaining the facts of the case that caused the
plaintiffs to file a medical malpractice claim against the defendant health care provider).
86
Id. at 864. The court stated:
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The plaintiffs argued that their case was similar to Miller, and the
issue is not whether the additional breach was raised, but whether two
breaches are distinguishable in the proposed complaint.87 The court
disagreed, determining that the plaintiffs failed “to present all claimed
breaches of the standard of care” to the Panel.88 The court distinguished
Miller, holding that the case should not be read so broadly “to allow a
plaintiff to argue at trial separate breaches of the standard of care that
were not presented in a submission of evidence to the panel.”89 The
Indiana Supreme Court chose not to hear the Chambers case, and medical
malpractice practitioners quickly recognized possible implications of the
decision.90 In addition to the rules from Miller and Chambers, there are
[T]he question of whether defendants breached the standard of care
must be presented to the medical review panel and answered based on
the evidence submitted to it. It logically follows that a malpractice
plaintiff cannot present one breach of the standard of care to the panel
and, after receiving an opinion, proceed to trial and raise claims of
additional, separate breaches of the standard of care that were not
presented to the panel and addressed in its opinion.
Id.
See id. (explaining the parties’ arguments for or against summary judgment); Miller,
679 N.E.2d at 1331 (explaining the facts, holding, and reasoning).
88
See Miller, 679 N.E.2d at 1332 (providing the court’s holding and reasoning, where it
determined “the plaintiffs’ action is [not] restricted by the substance of the submissions
presented to the medical review panel”).
89
See Chambers, 951 N.E.2d at 865 (providing the court’s reasoning for distinguishing the
case from the issue in Miller). The court stated:
As we are addressing a different issue, namely, Plaintiffs' failure to
present all claimed breaches of the standard of care to the Review
Panel, we do not interpret the above language so broadly as to allow a
plaintiff to argue at trial separate breaches of the standard of care that
were not presented in a submission of evidence to the panel.
Id.
90
See Chambers, 951 N.E.2d 855 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied, 962 N.E.2d 654 (Ind.
2011) (stating that the transfer was denied by a two-to-two decision); Hall Render, Can a
Plaintiff Present Evidence that There Was A Breach in the Standard of Care at Trial When Evidence
of the Breach of the Standard of Care Was Not Presented to the Medical Review Panel?, LITIGATION
ANALYSIS (Jan. 6, 2012), http://blogs.hallrender.com/blog/can-a-plaintiff-presentevidence-that-there-was-a-breach-in-the-standard-of-care-at-trial-when-evidence-of-thebreach-of-the-standard-of-care-was-not-presented-to-the-medical-review-panel/, archived
at http://perma.cc/PFY9-4TS3 (reviewing Chambers and determining that “a plaintiff must
present all claimed breaches of the standard of care to the medical review panel”); Alicia
Gallegos, Indiana Court: New Claims Can’t be Added to Lawsuits After Review, AM. MED. NEWS
(Aug. 15, 2011), http://www.amednews.com/article/20110815/profession/308159941/6/,
archived at http://perma.cc/4ZUK-6NSJ (discussing the Chambers decision and stating
“[s]ome plaintiff attorneys, however, are unhappy with the ruling, saying it changes the
way lawyers must present their cases”); Garau Germano Hanley & Pennington, P.C.,
Medical Review Panel Process Complicated by Indiana Court of Appeal’s Decision, IND. MED.
MALPRACTICE LAW. BLOG (July 31, 2011, 2:12 PM), http://www.indianapolis-medicalmalpractice-lawyer.com/blog/2011/07/medical-review-panel-process-complicated87
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various tools available to the trial court that relate to the Panel process,
and can be used during and after the time a Panel renders an opinion.91
D. The Power and Role of Trial Rules and Judicial Discretion
Rules that govern trial procedures are also relevant.92 Indiana Trial
Rule 26, mandating an ongoing duty to update discovery, and Indiana
Trial Rule 59, which addresses motions to correct errors, are specifically
important to the Panel process of medical malpractice cases because the
rules can be used as tools to combat the adverse effects of Chambers.93
Indiana Trial Rule 8 is also relevant, and will be briefly explained,
because it calls for pleadings to be construed in a manner that best
provides justice.94 Additionally, the power of judicial discretion in

by-indiana-court-of-appeals-decision.shtml, archived at http://perma.cc/N3NS-TADS
(discussing how Chambers will change the way attorneys handle cases). Garau, Germano,
Hanley, and Pennington state:
If the decision stands, it could create significant changes in the way
Indiana’s medical malpractice attorneys pursue and present their
cases. . . . The [decision] looks to change the panel process from an
informal administrative proceeding into something resembling a fullblown trial. . . . The court of appeals’ opinion creates a number of
problems for Indiana medical malpractice lawyers. . . . The
[Chambers] decision now places the burden on lay attorneys and their
clients to tell the panel what breaches of the standard of care arise from
the facts of the case, rather than rely on the panel to tell them where
the breaches are. If a patient fails to articulate a potential breach in his
submission to the panel, that breach cannot be raised in the trial court.
In order to avoid the risk of waiving a claim of negligence, lawyers for
the patients will now be forced to conduct full discovery at the panel
process stage. This will cause the cost of pursuing malpractice claims
to skyrocket.
Id.; Brad Catlin, Important Medical Malpractice Opinion on Experts and the Review Panel, IND. L.
UPDATE BLOG (July 19, 2011), http://www.indianalawupdate.com/2011/07/importantmedical-malpractice-opinion-on-experts-and-the-review-panel/, archived at http://perma.
cc/CNS4-7MF5 (“the full effect . . . will likely be felt outside the courtroom, rather than in
it” and will “increase the costs of litigation” and even “prevent lawyers from pursuing
some otherwise meritorious claims which would otherwise have been pursued”).
91
See infra Part II.D (discussing judicial discretion, various trial rules, and how they may
be used during and after the Panel process when evidentiary issues occur).
92
See infra notes 93–105 and accompanying text (providing a discussion of relevant trial
rules).
93
See infra notes 93–105 and accompanying text (explaining Rule 26, which requires
attorneys to amend information given to other parties when it is received up until trial, and
Rule 59, which can be used when a party discovers new evidence).
94
See infra note 106 and accompanying text (providing the statutory language of Trial
Rule 8, which requires that all pleadings should be construed in a way that provides
“substantial justice” and fairness).
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medical malpractice claims will be explored, as well as different areas of
law where judicial discretion tends to be broader.95
Indiana Trial Rule 26 plays a large role in the discovery process of
malpractice claims.96 First, the rule provides the framework for the
scope of discovery.97 Generally, attorneys may obtain any discovery that
The rule also governs the
is relevant to the pending action.98
supplementation of responses, better known as the “ongoing duty”
rule.99 Under this rule, attorneys have an ongoing duty until trial to
update information provided to other parties if new information
suggests the previous information is no longer accurate.100

95
See infra notes 106–09 and accompanying text (explaining that judicial discretion is
generally wide, but in medical malpractice claims, discretion is constrained by the Panel
requirement).
96
See Ind. T.R. 26 (providing the general provisions that govern discovery). The rule
plays a role in all civil and criminal claims, but this Note will refer to it in reference to
medical malpractice claims.
97
See Ind. T.R. 26(B) (detailing the discovery provisions). Trial Rule 26(B) states:
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged,
which is relevant to the subject-matter involved in the pending action,
whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking
discovery or the claim or defense of any other party, including the
existence, description, nature, custody, condition and location of any
books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity and
location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter.
Ind. T.R. 26(B)(1) (emphasis added); In re WTHR-TV v. Cline, 693 N.E.2d 1, 7 (Ind. 1998)
(determining that “[a]n item is ‘material’ if it appears that it might benefit the preparation”
of a party’s case); Hyundai Motor Co. v. Stamper, 651 N.E.2d 803, 808 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995)
(distinguishing relevancy in discovery from relevancy at trial by explaining that “[a]
document is relevant to discovery if there is the possibility that the information sought
may be relevant to the subject matter of the action”).
98
See supra note 97 (reviewing case law that interprets Trial Rule 26, specifically
concerning relevancy of evidence in discovery and at trial).
99
See infra note 100 (implying that the rule also encompasses the rule that attorneys have
an ongoing duty to update discovery, through statutory language such as “duty
seasonably” and “no longer true”).
100
See Ind. T.R. 26(E). The rule states:
A party is under a duty seasonably to amend a prior response if he
obtains information upon the basis of which
(a) he knows that the response was incorrect when made, or
(b) he knows that the response though correct when made is no
longer true and the circumstances are such that a failure to amend
the response is in substance a knowing concealment.
Id. (emphasis added); see Lucas v. Dorsey Corp., 609 N.E.2d 1191, 1196 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993)
(“The duty seasonably to supplement a discovery response is absolute and is not
predicated on a court order.”). For example, in the hypothetical contained in Part I, once
the attorney learned new information from Nurse Quinn, the attorney had a duty to share
the new information with the other parties. See supra Part I (posing a hypothetical scenario
in which the plaintiff’s attorney discovers new evidence after a Panel renders an opinion).
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Indiana Trial Rule 59 is also relevant to malpractice claims and the
Panel process because it addresses newly discovered evidence.101 Under
this rule, the trial court may consider evidence discovered after a final
judgment.102 Moreover, the newly discovered evidence must only be
supported by affidavits demonstrating its truthfulness.103 Trial judges
have the authority to grant relief based on the newly discovered
evidence, including amending the judgment or granting a new trial.104
Furthermore, the Indiana Supreme Court has articulated a nine-part test

101
See Ind. T.R. 59(A)–(C) (explaining that the motion may be used “when a party seeks
to address: (1) [n]ewly discovered evidence . . . capable of production within [thirty] days
of final judgment which, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered and
produced at trial”).
102
See supra note 100 (providing the statutory language that allows evidence discovered
within thirty days after a final judgment to be considered by the court); see also Babinchak
v. Town of Chesterton, 598 N.E.2d 1099, 1102–03 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (recognizing that a
motion to correct error may be predicated upon the assertion of newly discovered evidence
“if the proponent could not, with reasonable diligence, have earlier discovered and
produced such evidence”); Laudig v. Marion Cnty. Bd. of Voters Registration, 585 N.E.2d
700, 712 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992). The court stated:
To prevail on a motion to correct error based on newly discovered
evidence, [the proponent] needed to demonstrate that the evidence
could not have been discovered and produced at trial with reasonable
diligence; that the evidence is material, relevant, and not merely
cumulative or impeaching; that the evidence is not incompetent; that
[the proponent] exercised due diligence to discover the evidence . . . ;
that the evidence is worthy of credit; and, that the evidence raises a
strong presumption that a different result would have been reached
upon retrial.
Id. Compare Laudig, 585 N.E.2d at 712 (explaining the elements necessary for a party to
prevail on a motion to correct error based on newly discovered evidence), with Dumont v.
Davis, 992 N.E.2d 795, 810 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (holding that despite the defendant’s
misconduct of attempting “to add a new expert witness” beyond the pre-trial deadline, and
allowing another expert witness to give medical testimony beyond the area of expertise
disclosed to the court, the trial court erred in granting a new trial).
103
See Ind. T.R. 59(H)(1) (“When a motion to correct error is based upon evidence outside
the record, the motion shall be supported by affidavits showing the truth of the grounds set
out in the motion and the affidavits shall be served with the motion.”).
104
Ind. T.R. 59(J). The rule states:
The court, if it determines that prejudicial or harmful error has been
committed, shall take such action as will cure the error, including
without limitation the following with respect to all or some of the
parties and all or some of the errors: (1) Grant a new trial; (2) Enter
final judgment; (3) Alter, amend, modify or correct judgment; (4)
Amend or correct the findings or judgment . . .
Id.
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to determine whether it is appropriate to grant a new trial based on
newly discovered evidence.105
Judicial discretion, in combination with Indiana Trial Rule 8, are
powerful tools available to the trial court judge in all cases, but
specifically so in medical malpractice cases.106 Indiana Trial Rule 8 is
relevant to proposed complaints in malpractice actions because it
instructs courts to construe all pleadings “to do substantial justice, lead
to disposition on the merits, and avoid litigation of procedural points.”107
Additionally, statutes in chapter ten of the Act, which shapes the Panel
process, have been interpreted to allow wide judicial discretion.108 For
105
See Kahlenbeck v. Indiana, 719 N.E.2d 1213, 1218 (Ind. 1999) (articulating the test to
determine whether it is appropriate for the trial judge to grant a new trial based on newly
discovered evidence). The test includes:
To obtain a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, a defendant
must show that (1) the evidence has been discovered since the trial; (2)
it is material and relevant; (3) it is not cumulative; (4) it is not merely
impeaching; (5) it is not privileged or incompetent; (6) due diligence
was used to discover it in time for trial; (7) the evidence is worthy of
credit; (8) it can be produced on a retrial of the case; and (9) it will
probably produce a different result.
Id. Although this test was formulated in a criminal proceeding, it is relevant to malpractice
claims because Trial Rule 59 is available for civil and criminal claims. Ind. T.R. 59. See also
Hawkins v. Cannon, 826 N.E.2d 658, 663 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (citing Kahlenbeck, 719 N.E.2d
at 1218) (reaffirming that the nine part test must be used to order a new trial based on
newly discovered evidence).
106
See infra notes 107–09 and accompanying text (discussing Indiana Trial Rule 8 and the
powerful role of judicial discretion in other areas of law, such as administrative law
hearings, where judges have wide discretion to remand a case to an agency for further
investigation).
107
See Ind. T.R. 8(F) (“[a]ll pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice,
lead to disposition on the merits, and avoid litigation of procedural points”). The
fraudulent concealment doctrine might also be relevant to the Panel process of medical
malpractice claims, because the statute of limitations is tolled when a liable party conceals
information pertinent to another party’s malpractice claim. See IND. CODE § 34-11-5-1
(2014) (explaining the fraudulent concealment doctrine); see also Neal F. Eggeston, Jr.,
Snatching Confusion from the Jaws of Clarity: The Puzzling Evolution of the Discovery Rule Vis-àvis Indiana’s Medical Malpractice Statute of Limitations, 8 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 95, 129–31
(2011) (discussing, among other cases, Boggs v. Tri-State Radiology, Inc., 730 N.E.2d 692
(Ind. 2000), which touches on the doctrine of fraudulent concealment as it relates to medical
malpractice claims, specifically addressing statute of limitations concerns); Render et al.,
Health Care Law: A Survey of 1994 Developments, 28 IND. L. REV. 959, 962 (1995) (discussing
the application of the fraudulent concealment doctrine to a medical malpractice claim).
108
See Ramsey v. Moore, 959 N.E.2d 246, 250 (Ind. 2012) (holding that the trial court may
dismiss a proposed complaint during Panel review for failure to follow the Panel’s
schedule); Rambo v. Begley, 796 N.E.2d 314, 320 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (“[I]t is, however, well
settled that a trial court is vested with the discretion to impose appropriate sanctions.”);
Gleason v. Bush, 689 N.E.2d 1183, 1186 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (explaining that the trial court
has authority to impose sanctions upon parties that fail to comply with Act’s requirement);
Beemer v. Elskens, 677 N.E.2d 1117, 1119 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (considering whether the trial
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example, trial judges have the sole discretion to determine appropriate
sanctions when a panelist, attorney, or party fails to comply with the
requirements of the Act.109 In other areas, such as administrative law
proceedings, Indiana courts have interpreted judicial discretion so
broadly as to allow judges to remand cases to investigatory agencies for
further findings before a judge makes a final determination in the case.110
Considering the statutes defining the prerequisite Panel
requirement, conflicting case law such as Miller and Chambers, and all of
the trial court rules discussed, it is not surprising that similar medical

court abused its discretion by dismissing a proposed complaint); Cleary v. Indiana, 663
N.E.2d 779, 784 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (“the trial court has broad discretion in ruling on
violations of discovery”); Jones v. Wasserman, 656 N.E.2d 1195, 1197 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995)
(holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by issuing a sanction for a party’s
failure to comply with an evidentiary schedule set by the Panel); Rivers v. Methodist
Hosps., Inc., 654 N.E.2d 811, 814 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (determining that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion when it dismissed a claim due to the party’s bad faith during the
discovery process); Marshall v. Woodruff, 631 N.E.2d 3, 5 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (“[t]he trial
court is vested with broad discretion in ruling on the issues of discovery”); Hudgins v.
McAtee, 596 N.E.2d 286, 289 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (“[t]he grant or denial of motions for
discovery, motions for sanctions, and motions for a continuance rests in the sound
discretion of the trial court”); Galindo v. R.L. Christensen, M.D., 569 N.E.2d 702, 705 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1991) (discussing the trial court’s authority to impose sanctions); Doe Corp. v.
Honore, 950 N.E.2d 722, 728 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (determining that the trial court did have
subject matter jurisdiction to issue a preliminary determination of law regarding the
validity of a panel opinion); Rust v. Guinn, 429 N.E.2d 299, 305 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (stating
that the trial court has sound discretion to determine admissibility of evidence).
109
See supra note 108 (discussing court holdings reinforcing trial judges’ right of judicial
discretion during Panel review to determine appropriate sanctions for noncompliance with
the Act’s requirements).
110
See IND. CODE § 4-21.5-5-12(b) (2012). The statute states:
(b) The court may remand a matter to the agency before final
disposition of a petition for review with directions that the agency
conduct further factfinding or that the agency prepare an adequate
record, if:
(1) he agency failed to prepare or preserve an adequate record;
(2) the agency improperly excluded or omitted evidence from the
record; or
(3) a relevant law changed after the agency action and the court
determines that the new provision of law may control the
outcome.
Id. (emphasis added); Jackson v. Ind. Family & Soc. Servs. Admin., 884 N.E.2d 284, 292
(Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (interpreting an administrative law statute to allow the trial court to
“remand the matter to the agency before final disposition of a petition for judicial review
with directions for that agency to conduct further factfinding”); Jones v. Review Bd. of Ind.
Emp’t Sec. Div., 405 N.E.2d 601, 604–05 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (“When the administrative
board's decision precludes an award the findings of fact must exclude every possibility of
recovery. If the findings are found to be lacking in these areas the cause should be
remanded to the board.”).
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malpractice claims might easily yield very different results.111 Moreover,
the General Assembly is certainly under pressure to revise or amend the
Act.112 Even before the Chambers decision, the plaintiffs’ bar was
pressuring the Indiana General Assembly to amend or repeal parts of the
Act.113
III. ANALYSIS
Like Governor Bowen’s call to action almost forty years ago, it is
time for the Indiana General Assembly to readdress the Act.114 Part III
discusses and analyzes the current state of the Panel requirement of the
Act and the future of the Panel process with Miller v. Memorial Hospital of
South Bend and K.D. v. Chambers as precedent.115 First, Part III.A
discusses general challenges of the Panel requirement and the
implications of Miller and Chambers.116 Next, Part III.B compares trial
judges’ discretion to decide preliminary matters and the Panel
chairman’s discretion to deviate from the statutory requirements of the
panel procedure with the lack of discretion judges have to determine
discovery issues after a Panel renders an opinion.117 This section also
discusses two important discovery rules that affect the panel process—
Trial Rule 34, the ongoing duty rule, and Trial Rule 59, motion to correct
errors based on newly discovered evidence. Finally, Part III.C considers
the roles of the Indiana Supreme Court and the Indiana General
Assembly, and weighs the concerns of which body is in a better position
to remedy the inconsistencies caused by Chambers.118 This section also
111
See infra Part III (asserting that the different results reached in Miller and Chambers are
irreconcilable).
112
See Steven P. Lammers, Recent Developments in Medical Malpractice, 43 IND. L. REV. 855,
871 (2010) (providing a survey of recent decisions regarding the Act from October 1, 2008 to
September 30, 2009, and concluding that, during the survey period, the “General Assembly
did not add to, amend, or repeal any section of the Act,” although “pressure to do so
certainly comes from the plaintiff’s bar”).
113
See Lammers, supra note 112 and accompanying text (asserting that the plaintiff’s bar
was dissatisfied with the Indiana General Assembly’s lack of legislative action concerning
the Act from 2008 to 2009).
114
See supra note 28 and accompanying text (presenting Governor Bowen’s address to the
Indiana General Assembly, where he called for tort reform).
115
See infra Part III (analyzing the implications of Miller and Chambers, the statutory
requirements of the Act, and the tools available that might be useful to remedy the case law
implications to the Panel process).
116
See infra Part III.A (discussing the various challenges of the Panel requirement and
analyzing the Miller and Chambers decisions).
117
See infra Part III.B (analyzing the varying level of discretion afforded to trial judges in
medical malpractice claims with the wide discretion afforded in other areas of law).
118
See infra Part III.C (discussing the advantages and implications of the courts or general
assembly addressing the inconsistencies created by Miller and Chambers).
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addresses the concerns of allowing additional evidence to be considered
after a Panel renders an opinion.119
A. Inconsistencies and Implications of Miller and Chambers
In Indiana, a number of cases raise issues with the Panel requirement
of the Act.120 While courts have addressed various facets of the Panel
requirement many times, such as constitutionality, jurisdictional, and
compliance issues, Miller and Chambers are the only cases that directly
address separate breaches of the applicable standard of care by health
care providers.121 Although the facts of the cases differ, their similarities
were overlooked by the appellate court in Chambers, resulting in two

119
See infra Part III.C (discussing the implications of allowing Panels to consider evidence
of additional breaches after the Panel renders its opinion).
120
See infra note 121 (discussing challenges raised in court based on the constitutionality
of the Panel requirement, on grounds such as unreasonable delay, impermissible expense,
and the trial court’s authority and discretion to impose sanctions).
121
See IND. CODE § 34-18-10-14 (2014) (giving the court with jurisdiction the authority to
mandate sanctions for noncompliance by a party, attorney or panelist); Cha v. Warnick, 476
N.E.2d 109, 114 (Ind. 1985) (upholding the constitutionality of the Act by finding the Panel
proceedings not to be an unreasonable delay); Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp., Inc., 404
N.E.2d 585, 592 (Ind. 1980) (holding that the Panel requirement of the Act did not create
impermissible delay and expense, therefore is constitutional); see also Doe Corp. v. Honore,
950 N.E.2d 722, 728 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (determining the trial court did have subject matter
jurisdiction to issue a preliminary determination of law regarding the validity of the Panel
opinion); Harlett v. St. Vincent Hosps. & Health Svcs., 748 N.E.2d 921, 924 (Ind. Ct. App.
2001) (holding that the trial court and court of appeals have jurisdiction to determine
preliminary issues raised by the parties during the Panel process); Gleason v. Bush, 689
N.E.2d 1183, 1186 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (explaining that the trial court has authority to
impose sanctions upon parties that fail to comply with the Act’s requirement); Galindo v.
R.L. Christensen, M.D., 569 N.E.2d 702, 705 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (determining that the trial
court has authority to impose sanctions when a party “fails to act as required by this
chapter without good cause shown”). The basic rule, as defined in chapter eight of the Act
and subsequent case law, is that “an action against a health care provider may not be
commenced in a court in Indiana before: (1) the claimant’s proposed complaint has been
presented to a medical review panel . . . and (2) an opinion is given by the panel.” IND.
CODE § 34-18-8-4 (2014). See McGill v. Ling, 801 N.E.2d 678, 682 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (“[A]
medical malpractice action may not be brought against a health care provider until the
claimant's proposed complaint has been filed with the [IDOI] and an opinion has been
issued by a medical review panel.”); Winona Mem. Hosp. v. Kuester, 737 N.E.2d 824, 827
(Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (“Submission of a proposed complaint to a medical review panel is a
condition precedent to filing a medical malpractice claim in Indiana”); St. Anthony Med.
Ctr. v. Smith, 592 N.E.2d 732, 736 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that the trial court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction over a medical malpractice action where the original complaint
was filed in the trial court before the proposed complaint was filed with the Panel and
before the Panel rendered an opinion).
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opinions that are irreconcilable by trial judges, medical malpractice
attorneys, and parties in future medical malpractice cases.122
At issue in Miller was whether malpractice plaintiffs “sufficiently
articulated two separate injuries so as to avoid certain limitations
imposed by the [Act.]”123 The Indiana Supreme Court refused to limit
the reading of general injury allegations in the proposed complaint as
only alleging that one breach occurred by two defendant health care
providers.124 The court’s willingness to read a proposed complaint
broadly, and therefore not precluding the plaintiffs from litigating their
case, should be the standard practice of trial and appellate courts.125
With this rule as precedent, Chambers was decided fourteen years later.126
The facts in Chambers are simple, which made it an easy case for the
Indiana Court of Appeals to deliver this straightforward rule—
additional breaches of the standard of care by health care providers,
which are discovered after a Panel renders an opinion, cannot be raised
at trial.127 But the Court did not take into consideration future cases that
will not fit so neatly inside this rule.128 There will be instances where
122
See supra notes 77–89 and accompanying text (discussing the facts, holding, and
reasoning in Miller and Chambers).
123
See supra note 77 and accompanying text (recounting the pertinent facts of the Miller
case, as well as the court’s holding and reasoning). After the plaintiffs received an opinion
from the Panel based on a proposed complaint and the submission of evidence, the
plaintiffs used a virtually identical complaint in their filing with the trial court. Miller v.
Mem. Hosp. of S. Bend, Inc., 679 N.E.2d 1329, 1332 (Ind. 1997). The plaintiffs settled with
one defendant health care provider, leaving one other defendant health care provider in the
suit. Id. at 1330.
124
See supra note 77 and accompanying text (articulating the facts of Miller and the
nature of the breaches alleged by the plaintiffs in the proposed complaint).
125
See supra note 81 (reviewing the Miller holding that the substance of the plaintiffs’
submissions to the Panel does not restrict the plaintiffs from continuing to pursue their
medical malpractice claim against the remaining defendant health care provider).
126
See supra notes 84–89 and accompanying text (discussing Chambers and the appellate
court’s interpretation of the application of Miller).
127
See supra notes 84–86 and accompanying text (explaining the facts of the Chambers case
and the broad rule the court created). The plaintiff alleged in the proposed complaint:
“[t]he two physicians were careless and negligent in the care and treatment of [plaintiff], as
[plaintiff] suffered a Benadryl overdose while under their care. [Plaintiff] received various
other overdoses while under the care of defendant.” K.D. v. Chambers, 951 N.E.2d 855, 858
(Ind. Ct. App. 2011). At issue was the vagueness of the second allegation of “receiv[ing]
various other overdoses[.]” Id. The Court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that pleading
“various other overdoses” was sufficient under Indiana’s notice pleading. Id. at 858–59.
The Court explained that the notice pleading was “not per se insufficient,” but took issue
with the pleading because “no evidence of any breaches besides the overdose of Benadryl”
was contained in the plaintiff’s submission to the panel. Id. at 864.
128
See supra notes 82–89 and accompanying text (explaining the Chambers court’s
reasoning for its decision). Instead, the court differentiates the plaintiff’s case from the
facts of Miller. Chambers, 951 N.E.2d at 865. In Miller, the Indiana Supreme Court held that
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evidence of an additional breach is not discovered until after a Panel
opinion is rendered.129 With Chambers as precedent, this evidence cannot
be presented at trial under any circumstances.130
The Chambers rule leaves Indiana trial judges in a frustrating position
to properly—and fairly—address evidentiary issues that arise after a
Panel renders an opinion.131 In theory, the rule eliminates surprises at
trial.132 The rule would serve that purpose if it were interpreted in the
following manner: one party should not be blind-sided by (1) the
introduction of a brand new breach argument; and (2) evidence at trial
that was not brought to the table earlier.133 However, in practice, the
decision eliminates judges’ discretion to resolve discovery issues.134
the plaintiffs are not required to raise a distinction between two injuries in a panel
submission. Miller, 679 N.E.2d at 1332.
129
See, e.g., supra Part I (offering a hypothetical scenario that outlines the problems
created by Chambers). Additional examples include the discovery of medical records that
were previously thought to be “lost,” or information in medical charts that is later verified
to be inaccurate by a previously-unavailable witness. See also supra Part I (providing a
hypothetical situation outlining the problems that may arise with the current provisions in
the Act and the court’s interpretation of the Act); Hawkins v. Cannon, 826 N.E.2d 658, 663
(Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (arguing that newly discovered evidence, a video, that was not
available during the trial, should be considered by the court through a motion to correct
error). A specific rule that addresses how to proceed with and present newly discovered
evidence strengthens the argument that courts make every effort to permit all relevant
evidence, discovered in good faith, regardless of when it is discovered. For additional
resources and discussion of the fraudulent concealment doctrine, see Eggeston, supra note
107, at 129–31 and accompanying text (discussing, among other cases, Boggs v. Tri-State
Radiology, Inc., 730 N.E.2d 692 (Ind. 2000), which touches on the doctrine of fraudulent
concealment as it relates to medical malpractice claims, specifically addressing statute of
limitations concerns). This Note is not directed at evidence discovered as a result of “bad
lawyering,” which is precisely what Chambers is meant to prevent.
130
See supra note 86 and accompanying text (presenting the Court’s holding in Chambers,
where it determined that at trial, medical malpractice plaintiffs may only present evidence
of a breach of the applicable standard of care that was articulated in the proposed
complaint and reviewed by the Panel).
131
See supra note 86 and accompanying text (discussing the holding from Chambers); infra
notes 136–41 and accompanying text (arguing that trial courts will face difficult decisions in
future cases if they must decide whether a case more closely resembles Miller or Chambers).
132
See supra notes 82–89 (explaining the court’s reasoning for creating the broad rule
created by the Chambers opinion).
133
See infra note 136–39 and accompanying text (arguing that a more narrow reading of
Chambers is appropriate in some cases in order to allow trial courts to make a fair decision).
134
See supra note 142 and accompanying text (asserting that the rule from Chambers does
not allow judicial discretion to formulate an appropriate remedy, but instead, imposes a
broad rule that is not appropriate in all circumstances). Judges have historically been
granted wide discretion to deal with discovery issues. See Cleary v. Indiana, 663 N.E.2d
779, 784 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (“[T]he trial court has broad discretion in ruling on violations
of discovery.”); Marshall v. Woodruff, 631 N.E.2d 3, 5 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (“The trial court
is vested with broad discretion in ruling on the issues of discovery.”); Hudgins v. McAtee,
596 N.E.2d 286, 289 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (“The grant or denial of motions for discovery,
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Looking beyond a cut and dry scenario, like the facts of Chambers,
Indiana courts will, at some point, be faced with a situation where
evidence discovered after a Panel opinion will cause substantial injustice
if the trial judge does not have the authority to provide a remedy for the
inadmissibility of the evidence.135
Trial courts will be placed in a difficult situation if they are forced to
adopt a narrow reading of Miller and a broad reading of Chambers.136
First, expecting trial courts to follow a narrow reading of a rule from an
appellate court over a broad reading of a rule set out by the state’s high
court works completely against the hierarchical composition of our court
system.137 Second, the Chambers opinion did not give any indication that
the holding was fact-specific, or recognize that the holding might not be
generally applicable to future cases.138 Had the court acknowledged that
exceptions to its rule might exist, trial courts would have the necessary
breathing room to follow the Miller rule instead of Chambers rule.139
Finally, if trial courts are forced to follow Chambers in all cases in which
defendant health care providers argue that separate breaches were not
articulated in the proposed complaint, plaintiffs will be barred from
proving at trial that potentially liable health care providers contributed
to the injury of a patient.140 Other tools, namely judicial discretion, are
available in trial courts in order to remedy the incompatibility of Miller
and Chambers.141
motions for sanctions, and motions for a continuance rests in the sound discretion of the
trial court.”).
135
See infra Part IV (resolving the issues discussed in Part III with a proposed section to
chapter ten of the Act, which creates wide judicial discretion); infra Part V (revisiting the
hypothetical scenario posed in Part I and reconciling the problem through the proposed
statutory section introduced in Part IV).
136
See supra notes 81–83 and accompanying text (discussing the court’s holding and
reasoning in Miller); supra notes 86–89 and accompanying text (discussing the court’s
holding and reasoning in Chambers).
137
See supra notes 81–83 and accompanying text (reviewing the Miller court’s holding and
reasoning); supra note 86–89 and accompanying text (reviewing the Chambers court’s
holding and reasoning).
138
See supra notes 87–89 and accompanying text (presenting the court’s brief reasoning in
Chambers that led it to create such a broad rule with no mention of any possible exceptions).
139
See supra notes 86–90 and accompanying text (discussing the court’s broad reasoning
in Chambers, and that the Chambers court merely distinguished the Miller holding, instead of
creating a small exception to the Miller rule).
140
See infra notes 159–61 and accompanying text (discussing the implications of the
Chambers decision if trial judges are forced to follow a broad rule of law, instead of using
judicial discretion to determine whether the Panel should consider newly discovered
evidence under any circumstances).
141
See infra Part III.B (discussing judicial discretion and discovery rules that can be used
during the Panel process in order to correctly address cases where new evidence is
discovered after a Panel renders an opinion).
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B. Using Judicial Discretion to Remedy Case Law Inconsistencies
Chambers does not discuss the option of leaving discretion to trial
judges when new evidence is discovered.142 But other provisions in
chapter ten of the Act have been interpreted to provide trial courts with
authority and discretion to make certain findings before a panel renders
an opinion.143 For example, courts have wide discretion to determine
whether to impose sanctions for noncompliance with the Act’s
requirements.144 In other areas of law, such as the relationship between
administrative agency decisions and trial courts, courts have also been
given discretion to remand cases to respective agencies for further
determinations.145 Additionally, a feature of the panel process’ informal
design is that the panel chairman is afforded wide discretion to allow or
disallow parties to deviate from the guidelines set out in chapter ten.146
142
See supra notes 88–89 and accompanying text (discussing the court’s reasoning in
Chambers that led it to create such a broad rule with no exceptions).
143
See, e.g., IND. CODE § 34-18-10-14 (2014) (granting the trial court jurisdiction and the
authority to mandate sanctions for noncompliance by a party, attorney, or panelist).
Additionally, there are other instances in which trial judges are afforded discretion to
remand a case to an administrative agency for further review. See id. § 4-21.5-5-12(b). The
Code states:
(b) The court may remand a matter to the agency before final
disposition of a petition for review with directions that the agency
conduct further factfinding or that the agency prepare an adequate
record, if: (1) the agency failed to prepare or preserve an adequate
record; (2) the agency improperly excluded or omitted evidence from
the record; or (3) a relevant law changed after the agency action and
the court determines that the new provision of law may control the
outcome.
Id.
144
See supra note 108 (reviewing Indiana cases where courts have determined that trial
judges have wide discretionary authority to sanction parties for noncompliance during the
Panel process); Gleason v. Bush, 689 N.E.2d 1183, 1186 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (explaining that
the trial court has authority to impose sanctions upon parties that fail to comply with the
Act’s requirement); Galindo v. R.L. Christensen, M.D., 569 N.E.2d 702, 705 (Ind. Ct. App.
1991) (discussing the trial court’s authority to impose sanctions when a party “fails to act as
required by this chapter without good cause shown”).
145
See Jackson v. Ind. Fam. & Soc. Svcs. Admin., 884 N.E.2d 284, 292 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008)
(interpreting an administrative law statute to allow the trial court to “remand the matter to
the agency before final disposition of a petition for judicial review with directions for that
agency to conduct further factfinding”); Jones v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp. Sec. Div., 405
N.E.2d 601, 604–05 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (“When the administrative board's decision
precludes an award the findings of fact must exclude every possibility of recovery. If the
findings are found to be lacking in these areas the cause should be remanded to the board.”
(citations omitted)).
146
See IND. CODE § 34-18-10-20 (2014) (“Meetings shall be informal.”); see also Kemper,
supra note 31, at 1141 (“The panel is not bound by formalities.”). The panel chairman has
discretion in determining if a party or panelist may go beyond a deadline set by the Act.
See IND. CODE § 34-18-10-3 (2014) (giving the panel chairman authority to serve in an
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Moreover, attorneys have an ongoing duty to update discovery,
suggesting newly discovered evidence is intended to be included in the
judicial process.147
Along with an attorney’s ongoing duty to update discovery comes
the possibility of the discovery of new evidence that suggests an
additional, separate breach in the standard of care by a medical
provider.148 When a party discovers new evidence, the next step to be
able to use this new evidence seemingly should be to submit it to the
Panel for an additional determination of whether this evidence suggests
a separate breach in the standard of care.149 However, no mechanism
exists that allows a party to request that a Panel evaluate new evidence
for an additional breach after that Panel renders its opinion.150
Essentially, Chambers takes the discretion to do so out of the hands of
trial judges.151
advisory capacity); Doe Corp. v. Honore, 950 N.E.2d 722, 728 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011)
(affirming statutory language giving the panel chair an advisory role); Kranda v. HouserNorborg Med. Corp., 419 N.E.2d 1024, 1024 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (extending the chairman’s
authority to include the allowance of additional evidence to be submitted to the panel
before it renders an opinion). IND. CODE § 34-18-10-20(a) (2014). The statute states:
Either party, after submission of all evidence and upon ten (10) days
notice to the other side, has the right to convene the panel at a time and
place agreeable to the members of the panel. Either party may
question the panel concerning any matters relevant to issues to be
decided by the panel before the issuance of the panel’s report.
Id.
147
See Ind. T.R. 34 (discussing the scope of discovery and production of requested
documents). The rule does not directly state this proposition. However, discovery can
continue up until a trial and after a final judgment.
148
See id. (discussing Ind. T.R. 34 concerning the scope of discovery and production of
requested documents); supra note 100 and accompanying text (providing the statutory
language of the “ongoing duty” rule).
149
See infra Part IV.B (arguing that the proposed statutory language will remedy this
problem); see also Kemper, supra note 31, at 1141 (“If new theories are submitted to a court
after the panel opinion is rendered, the defendant has a basis to argue for reconvening the
panel and submitting the new claims to the panel.”)
150
See supra notes 136–41 and accompanying text (asserting that the implications of the
Chambers decision will be felt in future medical malpractice cases, mainly because the rule
is irreconcilable with the Miller decision, and it does not allow judicial discretion).
151
See supra notes 136–41 and accompanying text (presenting the implications of the
Chambers decision); see also Murphy, supra note 61, at 179 (discussing the Medical
Malpractice Act many years before Chambers, where Murphy, an attorney, essentially
predicts the problem addressed by this Note). Murphy points out:
A good argument can be made that a plaintiff should be barred from
presenting any evidence at trial concerning an act or acts of
malpractice, which were not charged in the complaint or presented to
the panel prior to the rendition of its opinion. If the plaintiff fails to
submit such evidence, then obviously the purpose of panel screening is
circumvented.
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Also consider Indiana Trial Rule 59, addressing when parties may
file a motion to correct errors.152 This rule directly addresses the
admission of newly discovered evidence—that is, evidence discovered as
late as after a final judgment is entered.153 When a motion to correct
error based on evidence outside the record is used, the motion must only
be “supported by affidavits showing the truth of the grounds set out in
the motion and the affidavits shall be served with the motion.”154 By
only requiring its truthfulness to be supported by affidavits, the
language of this rule suggests the high value of newly discovered
evidence that could alter the decision of the case.155 Coupled with the
various trial rules discussed, these additional rules present a strong
indication that Indiana courts should have the authority to determine
when newly discovered evidence, even in a medical malpractice case
with a Panel requirement, is admissible.156
Miller and Chambers cannot be reconciled with these rules of
evidence and trial rules unless trial judges are afforded discretion to
consider newly discovered evidence.157 The Act only mandates that an
action “may not be commenced” before “the claimant’s proposed
complaint has been presented to” a Panel.158 The Act does not include
language that states parties are only entitled to one Panel opinion,

Id. This is the most direct recognition of the problem addressed in this Note. Interestingly,
the article was written more than a decade before Chambers was decided, and has not been
discussed in further detail in any other source.
152
See supra note 100 and accompanying text (providing the statutory language for a
motion to correct errors, and discussing how this trial rule works and how it can be used in
medical malpractice cases).
153
See supra note 100 and accompanying text (explaining the broad scope of a motion to
correct errors).
154
See Ind. T.R. 59(H)(1) (“When a motion to correct error is based upon evidence outside
the record, the motion shall be supported by affidavits showing the truth of the grounds set
out in the motion and the affidavits shall be served with the motion.”).
155
See supra note 100 and accompanying text (reviewing the statutory language and
explaining how this trial rule can be used in medical malpractice cases).
156
See supra Part II.D (explaining the general applicability of the trial rules as they relate
to medical malpractice cases, and the various instances where the rules have been used in
medical malpractice cases).
157
See supra Part II.C (presenting case discussions for Miller and Chambers); supra Part II.D
(discussing the various trial rules that can be used after the Panel process).
158
IND. CODE § 34-18-8-4(1) (2014). The Code states:
Notwithstanding section 1 of this chapter, and except as provided in
sections 5 and 6 of this chapter, an action against a health care provider
may not be commenced in a court in Indiana before: (1) the claimant's
proposed complaint has been presented to a medical review panel
established under IC 34-18-10 (or IC 27-12-10 before its repeal); and (2)
an opinion is given by the panel.
Id.
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therefore the Chambers opinion should not be used to have that effect.159
Interpreting Chambers to bar additional Panel review, even when a trial
judge finds that it is appropriate and not allowing a Panel to review it
will create injustice, in effect creates a new statute.160 This is clearly the
job of the Indiana General Assembly, which can receive input from trial
attorneys, the IDOI, health care providers, and concerned citizens, not
just the appellate court.161
Through judicial discretion, trial judges can determine when, and if,
newly discovered evidence should be subject to additional review by a
Panel in order to fairly adjudicate the plaintiff’s case.162 Since trial judges
have wide discretion to decide other evidentiary matters, from deadline
extensions to sanctions, the Act should afford the necessary breathing
room to allow newly discovered evidence to be admitted when a trial
judge determines the evidence, which the Panel did not previously
review, should be considered by the trier of fact.163 In order for trial
judges across the state to exercise broad judicial discretion in these
instances, the Indiana Supreme Court or General Assembly must clarify
the permissible uses and limits of judicial discretion regarding the Panel
process.164
C. The Roles of the Indiana Supreme Court and General Assembly
By denying transfer, the Indiana Supreme Court leaves many
answerable questions unresolved.165 Though some might argue the best
remedy is to let case law develop, the Chambers decision will allow
evidence to be unfairly excluded until the issue is more thoroughly
159
See supra note 63 and accompanying text (providing the statutory language from the
Act that requires a Panel to render an opinion, and various case law discussing a Panel’s
responsibilities under the Act).
160
See supra notes 84–90 and accompanying text (discussing the facts, holding, and
reasoning in the Chambers case, including the Chambers court’s unwillingness to carve out
any exceptions to the broad rule it created).
161
See supra Part II.A (discussing the Indiana General Assembly’s call to action from
Governor Bowen and the creation of the Act by the General Assembly).
162
See infra Part IV.A (proposing a possible solution to allow newly discovered evidence
to be evaluated by a Panel or judge with broad judicial discretion to determine whether a
case is appropriate for additional Panel review).
163
See supra notes 106–09 and accompanying text (reviewing examples of the legislature
providing wide judicial discretion in other matters that arise during the Panel process, such
as a trial judge’s authority to impose sanctions for noncompliance by an attorney).
164
See infra Part III.C (exploring whether the Indiana Supreme Court or the Indiana
General Assembly is the best decision maker to clarify the bounds of judicial discretion
during the Panel process).
165
See supra note 90 and accompanying text (discussing the Indiana Supreme Court’s
decision to deny transfer, thus refusing to hear the Chambers case and then providing an
opinion about its broad holding).
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addressed.166 There is no way of knowing when the right case with a
perfect fact scenario will come along and find its way in front of the
Indiana Supreme Court.167 Silence by the court is a strong indicator that
the legislature is in a better position to remedy the problem.168 The
legislature can fully examine the difficulties with the Panel process and
optimize its usefulness.169
There are three viable concerns against allowing Panels to review
additional breaches discovered after an opinion is rendered: (1) it will
add length to an already lengthy process; (2) this situation is not one that
occurs regularly; and (3) it will give lawyers the dreaded “second bite at
the apple.”170 The first concern is understandable, considering the
Indiana Supreme Court has continuously considered whether the Panel
requirement is an unconstitutional delay.171 The trial judge can easily
control these concerns with judicial discretion.172 Discretion will allow
judges to ensure any additional review is brief, and to discern the parties
who truly made a good-faith discovery after a Panel renders an opinion

166
See infra notes 190–92 (examining the possible implications of altering the Panel
chapter of the Act); infra note 194 (addressing the probability of allowing the issue to be
resolved by the Indiana Supreme Court at some point in the future).
167
See infra note 194 (asserting that since the issue is not common, it is not likely to be
raised with regularity in court, and therefore creates uncertainty as to when the Indiana
Supreme Court might ever have the opportunity to decide the issue).
168
See infra note 194 and accompanying text (exploring the possibility that the best
remedy is to let the case law develop over time). The legislature is in a better position
because it can receive feedback from all parties involved and interested in the Act, such as
plaintiffs, attorneys, medical providers, and insurance companies. See Lammers, supra note
112 and accompanying text (discussing discontent by Indiana attorneys and their call to the
Indiana General Assembly to re-examine the Act). This Note does not address the issue of
whether the entire Act is in need of an overhaul by the legislature.
169
See infra note 195 and accompanying text (arguing that the Indiana General Assembly
is in the best position to offer a comprehensive remedy to this issue because it can receive
input from trial attorneys, trial judges, the IDOI, health care providers, and concerned
citizens).
170
See infra notes 190–92 and accompanying text (addressing the potential concerns with
the proposed statutory language).
171
See supra note 74 (citing Indiana Supreme Court decisions upholding the Act’s
constitutionality because the Panel process was not found to be an unreasonable delay or
expense); see also Kemper et al., supra note 31, at 1143–45 (discussing various bases for
constitutional challenges of the Act); Indiana’s Medical Malpractice Act: Results of a Three Year
Study, supra note 32, at 1303 (reviewing the constitutionality of the delays caused by the
Panel process); Hurlbut, supra note 39, at 507 (examining the constitutional challenges to
the Act); Williams, supra note 60, at 497 (explaining why the constitutionality of the Act was
challenged, focusing on the delay caused by Panel review).
172
See supra notes 106–10 (discussing the various areas of law that trial judges have wide
discretion to resolve evidentiary issues, such as administrative law hearings).
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from those that did not complete due diligence in their discovery efforts
before the Panel renders an opinion.173
IV. CONTRIBUTION
Although the Panel requirement of the Act adds a significant amount
of time to the life of a medical malpractice lawsuit, if adequate
limitations are included, Panels can take a second look at new evidence
in cases where a party discovers an additional breach in the standard of
care after a Panel decision, without creating a substantial delay to the
process.174 Amending the Act to give judges discretion to remand cases
in limited instances is an effective way of eliminating the issue of barring
plaintiffs from arguing additional breaches at trial.175 However, this
proposition is based on the plaintiff raising an additional breach that he
could not reasonably discover before a Panel renders an opinion.
The Indiana General Assembly must reconcile the various tools
available that already provide trial judges with discretion when dealing
with evidentiary issues and the respective arguments for and against
changing the Panel process of the Act.176 Judges, panelists, parties,
attorneys, the IDOI, and health care providers all need clear direction on
how to address additional evidence discovered after a Panel renders an
opinion.177 The General Assembly is in a position to provide a legislative

173
See also Ind. T.R. 8(F) (“All pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice,
lead to disposition on the merits, and avoid litigation of procedural points.”). This rule
encompasses the overall reasoning for this Note. Judges are capable of differentiating the
good from the bad, so they should be afforded the opportunity to do so. For example,
given discretion, a judge could easily differentiate a party who tries to save money by not
hiring an expert to look over a patient’s medical records before submitting evidence to a
panel from a party that found, after a panel rendered an opinion, that a hospital employee
did not accurately notate steps taken to resuscitate a patient. Revisit the hypothetical posed
in Part I of this Note, and compare that situation with “save money by not hiring an
expert” scenario described above.
174
See supra Part II.B (explaining the issues with the extended length of the Panel process
in light of the short statutory deadlines); infra Part IV.B (arguing that any additional delay
caused by a second Panel review will be minimal due to strict time limitations imposed by
the proposed section to chapter ten of the Act).
175
See supra Part I (posing a hypothetical situation where the plaintiff discovered
evidence of an additional breach after the Panel rendered an opinion, therefore making the
new evidence inadmissible under Chambers).
176
See supra Part II.D (explaining the trial rules relevant to the Panel process); supra Part
III.C (addressing the Indiana General Assembly’s potential role in reconciling the
implications created by Chambers).
177
See infra Part IV.A (providing a proposed section to chapter 10 of the Act that will
allow trial judges to remand cases to a Panel for further review, and includes strict time
limitations for this additional process).
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remedy to this problem by adding an additional section to chapter ten of
the Act that allows broad judicial discretion.178
The remainder of this Part focuses on proposing an additional
section that the Indiana General Assembly can add to chapter ten of the
Act.179 The language included in this proposed section will ensure that
judges, parties, and panelists have proper guidance of the limited
instances in which it is appropriate to remand a case to a Panel for
further review, the evidence that may be submitted to the Panel on
remand, and the time limitations of an additional Panel determination.180
A. Proposed Section to the Act’s Chapter Addressing Panel Requirements
The Indiana General Assembly should insert the proposed section
between section 34-18-10-22, discussing the Panel’s duties and available
opinions, and section 34-18-10-23, discussing the admissibility of the
Panel’s report as evidence at trial.181 The Indiana General Assembly
should place it there because the situation the proposed section
addresses will occur in sequence between the Panel’s initial opinion and
the use of the Panel’s opinion at trial.182
The Indiana General Assembly should amend the Act to include the
proposed section, as follows:
(a) Upon good faith discovery of any materially relevant
evidence after a Panel opinion is rendered, a party shall
promptly notify the court and all parties.
(b) The evidence must lead the party to reasonably believe a
separate, additional breach in the applicable standard of
care occurred that was not known at the time of the
original Panel submission and could not reasonably be
discovered at that time.

178
See supra Part III (addressing the concerns created by the conflicting opinions in Miller
and Chambers); infra Part IV.A (proposing an additional section for chapter ten of the Act to
address the concerns raised in Part III).
179
See infra Part IV.A (providing new statutory language to add to chapter ten of the Act
to alleviate the inconsistencies of Miller and Chambers); infra Part IV.B (discussing the
suggested placement of the proposed section, the reasoning for placing the section between
two other statutes in chapter ten, and addressing the potential criticisms of the proposed
section).
180
See infra note 192 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of clear guidance
to trial judges, parties, and Panelists to ensure the additional review is limited and timely).
181
The reason for the suggested placement of the proposed section is the contribution of
the author.
182
The suggested placement of the proposed section is the contribution of the author.
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(c) The party must notify the court of the discovery and
request a hearing, which must be held within thirty (30)
days of making the request.
(d) The trial judge shall have broad discretion to determine,
based on a reasonableness standard, whether the Panel
should consider the newly discovered evidence before the
case is further adjudicated.
(e) If the judge determines a Panel should consider this
evidence, the judge may remand the case for further Panel
review, or, if justice requires, make a judicial
determination whether the evidence is admissible without
Panel review.
(f) The Panel shall be comprised of the same members of the
original Panel appointed to the case, and if any original
member is unavailable, the trial judge shall appoint a
replacement.
(g) The same Panel chairman, if available, shall oversee the
process, and make every reasonable effort to ensure the
Panel renders a timely opinion.
(h) The parties shall have thirty (30) days to prepare
additional evidence to submit to the Panel. The evidence
shall be limited only to evidence reasonably related to the
moving party’s claim of an additional breach in the
standard of care. The trial judge may not grant an
extension of time to any party.
(i) The Panel shall have sixty (60) days to review the
submitted evidence and render a written opinion. The
opinion shall be delivered to the trial court and all parties.
The trial judge shall have the discretion to grant one (1)
extension of time, no more than thirty (30) days, if
requested by the Panel.
(j) To expedite the Panel’s deliberation, the Panel does not
have to meet in person to discuss the evidence. Telephone
conferences and video conferences are permitted so long as
all panelists are present for the conferences. Panelists are
subject to sanctions by the court for failure to make every
reasonable effort to ensure the timeliness of the Panel’s
opinion.
(k) The Panel may request that the trial court convene the
parties to present arguments concerning only the
additional evidence. If the Panel selects this process, all
panelists must be present and an opinion may be rendered
at the conclusion of the hearing.
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(l) If the panelists request additional time to deliberate after
parties present arguments, the Panel must render its
expert opinion, in writing, within thirty (30) days of the
hearing.
(m) The trial court shall have limited jurisdiction during the
course of the remand, and may impose sanctions upon
any panelist, attorney, or party who causes unreasonable
delay in the process.
(n) All other sections of the statute set out in the Act, to the
extent they do not contradict these provisions, shall
apply.183
B. Commentary
Most subsections are crafted with brief time periods so that parties,
the trial judge, and the Panel cannot create an unreasonable delay.184
Subsection c requires that the initial hearing to address evidence of an
additional breach must be held within thirty days of when a party
notifies the court.185 Subsections f and g attempt to reassemble the same
Panel that previously examined the evidence in the case.186 Subsection i
limits the Panel’s time to issue an additional expert opinion to sixty days,
and subsection l only allows the trial judge to grant the Panel one thirty
day time extension to issue its opinion, if needed.187
This proposed section is the best solution because it gives clear
direction and guidance to parties, attorneys, trial judges, and panelists.

The proposed section is italicized and is the contribution of the author.
See supra note 183 and accompanying text (providing the proposed section to chapter
ten of the Act, which includes subsections with short time limitations).
185
See supra note 183 and accompanying text (“(c) The party must notify the court of the
discovery and request a hearing, which must be held within thirty (30) days of making the
request.”).
186
See supra note 183 and accompanying text (“(f) The Panel shall be comprised of the same
members of the original panel appointed to the case, and if any original member is unavailable, the
trial judge shall appoint a replacement. (g) The same Panel chairman, if available, shall oversee the
process, and make every reasonable effort to ensure the Panel renders a timely opinion.”).
187
See supra note 183 and accompanying text (providing the proposed statutory language
to chapter ten of the Act). It states:
(i) The Panel shall have sixty (60) days to review the submitted evidence
and render a written opinion. The opinion shall be delivered to the trial court
and all parties. The trial judge shall have the discretion to grant one (1)
extension of time, if requested.
(l) If the panelists request additional time to deliberate after parties present
arguments, the Panel must render its expert opinion, in writing, within thirty
(30) days of the hearing.
Id.
183
184

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2015

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 49, No. 3 [2015], Art. 14

992

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49

The proposed section also ensures any additional delay is minimal by
requiring the trial judge to enforce thirty to sixty day deadlines on
attorneys and panelists.188 Furthermore, the proposed section only
allows the trial judge to grant one thirty day extension to the Panel, and
zero time extensions to the parties, which will ensure the additional Panel
review is timely.189
There are two major arguments and a few concerns against
amending the Act. First, critics may argue that the Indiana Supreme
Court is best left to resolve this issue because it has already set precedent
with Miller.190 Second, critics may argue that allowing judges to remand
cases for an additional determination from a Panel will significantly
increase the length of time to resolve an already lengthy process.191
However, the proposed section includes strict time limitations for
additional Panel review to ensure any further delay is minimal.192 By
remanding the case to the Panel that reviewed the original submission
and is familiar with the evidence, rather than assigning it to a new Panel,
the length of time required can be significantly decreased.
A legislative solution created by the Indiana General Assembly is the
most direct and effective way to remedy the inconsistencies in Miller and
Chambers.193 Waiting for the Indiana Supreme Court to accept an
appropriate case to set guidelines for remand could take years, if it ever
occurs at all.194 The Indiana General Assembly is in a better position to

188
See supra note 183 and accompanying text (articulating the proposed statutory
language, specifically subsections (c), (h), (i), and (l), which impose thirty or sixty day time
limitations on attorneys and panelists).
189
See supra note 183 and accompanying text (including specific statutory language in
subsection (i) that allows trial judges to only grant one thirty day time extension to the
Panel).
190
See supra notes 77–83 and accompanying text (presenting the facts, holding, and
reasoning of the only Indiana Supreme Court case that directly addresses the issue, Miller).
191
See supra note 41 and accompanying text (discussing the substantial length of time the
Panel process adds to the overall disposition of medical malpractice claims, and that the
statutory timeframe is never met).
192
See supra note 183 and accompanying text (providing examples of clear language in
the proposed statute to ensure strict time limitations on additional Panel review).
193
See supra Part III.C (evaluating the benefits of a solution stemming from the Indiana
General Assembly, especially considering the Indiana Supreme Court’s denial of transfer in
the Chambers case, along with the uncertainty of the “perfect” case coming through the
judicial system and eventually finding its way to Indiana’s high court).
194
See supra note 90 and accompanying text (discussing the unlikelihood of this issue
arising and the Indiana Supreme Court accepting it in light of the court’s denial of transfer
of the Chambers case).
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amend the Act because it can receive input from trial attorneys, the IDOI,
health care providers, and concerned citizens.195
In light of the Chambers decision and the implications it will have on
future medical malpractice cases, it is time that the Indiana General
Assembly revisits the Panel provision of the Act to eliminate confusion
and conflicting case law. Hoping that the Indiana Supreme Court hears
a case that perfectly addresses all of the issues this Note raises is
impractical and unrealistic.196 For that reason, the Indiana General
Assembly is in the best position to provide a remedy to trial judges,
medical malpractice attorneys, and medical malpractice patients who
will seek relief under the Act.197
V. CONCLUSION
Currently, the Act and Indiana case law do not permit new evidence
of additional breaches in the standard of care, discovered in good faith
after a Panel opinion, to come into evidence under any circumstances.198
Although Miller v. Memorial Hospital of South Bend and K.D. v. Chambers
use different reasoning in determining the fate of additional breaches,
neither decision directly addresses the concerns raised in this Note.199
These decisions do indicate that the outcome of future cases with similar
issues could be resolved using the reasoning of either case, but
predicting how a court will rule is unclear.200 Thus far, courts will likely
See Indiana’s Medical Malpractice Reform Revisited, supra note 31, at 1047 (asserting that a
balance must be struck in order for medical malpractice reform to be successful). In
addressing the balance:
The adoption of tort reform in any field, including malpractice,
involves the balancing of interests among injured claimants, tortfeasors
and the insurers that effectively finance the tort claim awards and
settlement of tortfeasors. If the balance is struck too far in favor of
tortfeasors and their insurers, tort claimants have reduced access to fair
compensation for their injuries. If the balance is struck too far in favor
of tort claimants, the ability of tortfeasors and their insurers to finance
tort claims and settlements is compromised.
Id.; see also supra note 34 (providing an example of current legislative action in order to
remedy an issue with the patient’s compensation fund provision in the Act, which reduces
the payout time from six months to three months).
196
See supra note 90 and accompanying text (addressing the Indiana Supreme Court’s
denial of transfer of the Chambers case).
197
See supra notes 193–94 and accompanying text (discussing the competing roles of the
Indiana courts and the General Assembly).
198
See supra Part II.C (explaining Miller and Chambers); supra Part III.A (analyzing the
rules of law from Miller and Chambers).
199
See supra notes 82–83 (discussing the reasoning in Miller); supra note 89 (providing the
reasoning for the court’s decision in Chambers).
200
See supra Part III.A (distinguishing the outcomes of Miller and Chambers).
195
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be split on which precedent to follow when analyzing additional
breaches.201 If a court views the additional breach as one that was
expressed in the proposed complaint, clearly or vaguely, the court will
likely follow Miller and determine whether the breach was articulated
enough to be considered a separate breach.202 If a court views the
additional breach as new and separate from the breach, or breaches,
alleged in the proposed complaint, the court will likely follow Chambers
and determine that evidence of that separate breach is inadmissible.203
Through the additional section to chapter ten of the Act proposed in
Part IV.A, the hypothetical scenario presented in Part I is easily
resolved.204 Olivia requests a court hearing, and presents evidence of an
additional breach in the standard of care by Lynniebrook Hospital that
was not previously presented to the Panel.205 The judge determines the
evidence was discovered in good faith, and remands the case to the
Panel that reviewed Olivia’s original submission for further review.206
The judge instructs the Panel that its inquiry is strictly limited to the new
evidence and stays the proceedings while the panelists review it.207 Once
the Panel renders an opinion on whether there was an additional breach
of the standard of care, the court regains jurisdiction and proceeds with
adjudication.208 Following the proposed statute, courts will not have to
decide whether Miller or Chambers is more applicable to each case.209
If the Indiana General Assembly passes a similar statute to the Panel
chapter of the Act, the three major problems under the current Act will
be resolved.210 First, attorneys will be able to honor the ongoing duty to
update discovery responses until trial, and the statute ensures that a

201
See supra Part III.A (considering the conflicting rules of law produced by Miller and
Chambers).
202
See supra notes 77–83 (reviewing Miller).
203
See supra notes 84–90 (discussing Chambers).
204
See supra Part IV (proposing an additional section to chapter ten of the Act as a
legislative remedy to the issue created by Chambers); supra Part I (providing a hypothetical
scenario that highlights the implications of Chambers).
205
See supra Part I (providing a hypothetical scenario that highlights the implications of
Chambers); supra Part IV (proposing a method by which the problem presented in the
hypothetical scenario can be resolved by the trial judge).
206
See supra Part I (providing a hypothetical scenario); supra Part IV.A (resolving the
issue raised in the scenario through the proposed statute).
207
See supra Part IV.B (arguing that the proposed statute provides clear guidelines to trial
judges).
208
See supra Part IV.B (asserting that the proposed statute allows the trial court to retain
limited jurisdiction during the additional Panel review to ensure the process is timely).
209
See supra Part II.A (discussing the conflicting decisions in Miller and Chambers).
210
See supra Part III (explaining the implications of the current law); supra Part IV.B
(addressing the concerns of each through the proposed statute).
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Panel may review newly discovered evidence.211 Second, plaintiffs will
be afforded the opportunity to litigate based on an additional breach,
even after a Panel reviews the evidence of the additional breach.212
Finally, Indiana courts will have concrete statutory language to follow,
which will resolve any inconsistency in case law.213 Without legislative
action from the Indiana General Assembly, the “big fish” defendants,
like Lynniebrook Hospital in the hypothetical, will continue to be off the
hook for injuries caused by its employees if the relevant evidence is
buried deep enough that it cannot be discovered before a Panel renders
an opinion.214
Ashley Bullock Green*

See supra Part II.D (explaining the ongoing duty rule and the duties of the Panel).
See supra Part IV.B (explaining how the proposed statute will ensure parties can fully
litigate all claims of breaches in the standard of care by health care providers).
213
See supra Part III.A (analyzing the opposite holdings in Miller and Chambers due to
varying judicial interpretation of the statutes and case law).
214
See supra Part I (posing a hypothetical scenario to be resolved by the statutory section
proposed in Part IV.A); supra Part IV.B (addressing the future implications to medical
malpractice cases if the Indiana General Assembly does not adopt a new statute addressing
the problematic case law created by Chambers).
*
J.D. Candidate, Valparaiso University Law School (2015); B.S., Criminal Justice,
Indiana University East (2011). This Note is my first publication and is dedicated to my
husband, John Green, who is my biggest supporter. John, I appreciate your patience and
love for me while I spent so much time on this Note, and on my entire law school career. I
would also like to thank my dad, Bob Bullock, for cheering me on through this whole
experience. Special thanks to Lake County Superior Court Civil Division 6 Judge John R.
Pera for the wonderful opportunity to clerk for you and for providing the inspiration for
the topic of this Note. Thank you to my Faculty Advisor, Adjunct Professor Daniel A.
Gioia, for helping me understand this area of law with your endless knowledge and
experience. Finally, thank you to the Valparaiso University Law Review Volume 48
Executive Board and my mentor, Danelle Albosta, for your edits, advice, and
encouragement.
211
212

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2015

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 49, No. 3 [2015], Art. 14

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol49/iss3/14

